COLLECTOR'S "BOLD GAMBIT" TO THWART FDCPA CLAIM
THWARTED ON APPEAL
Debt collectors cannot evade the restrictions of the [FDCPA] by forcing a debtor’s claims to be auctioned, acquiring the claims, and dismissing them. To allow otherwise would thwart enforcement of the FDCPA and undermine its purpose. Arellano v Clark County Collection Service, LLC, Borg Law Group, LLC, No.16-15467 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017) (federal law preempts a private party’s use of state execution procedures to acquire and destroy a debtor’s FDCPA claims against it).
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. COLLECTION SERV.
OPINION
THOMAS,
Chief Judge:
Can
a debt collector avoid liability under the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act by obtaining the debtor’s lawsuit through a writ of execution? We
conclude that such a procedure frustrates the Act’s purpose and is thus preempted.
I
Patricia
Arellano was overdue on a small amount of medical debt—$371.89 to be precise. A
private collection agency, Clark County Collection Services, sent her a letter about
it. Included with the letter was a summons and state justice court complaint
seeking collection of the debt. The complaint itself stated that Arellano could
“[d]ispute the validity
of this debt” within 30 days, but that failing to do so would result in a
presumption of validity. However, separately, in small print, the summons
indicated that to defend the lawsuit, Arellano must file a formal written response
with the court within 20 days.
Arellano
did not file a response, and the collection agency obtained a default judgment
against her in justice court for $793.39. The debt had doubled in the
intervening month because it now included costs, pre-judgment interest, and attorney
fees.
Subsequently,
Arellano filed suit against the collection agency and its law firm under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or “the Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. She claimed that they had engaged in misleading practices
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1) by stating that the debtor
could dispute the debt within 30 days of receipt, when the actual summons
required the filing of an answer in court within 20 days. She further alleged
that Clark County Collection Services’ name impermissibly implied affiliation with
the Clark County government, violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1).
The
collection agency countered with a bold gambit.
Armed
with its default judgment, it requested the justice court to issue a writ of
execution against Arellano in the amount of $826.72, an increased amount
reflecting additional costs. Like most states, Nevada allows courts to
authorize a sheriff to levy on the property of a judgment debtor to satisfy a judgment.
Butwinick v. Hepner, 291 P.3d 119, 121 (Nev. 2012). With some exceptions not
relevant here, the property subject to a writ of execution in Nevada includes a
“right to bring
an action to recover a debt, money, or thing.” Gallegos v. Malco Enters. of
Nev., 255 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Nev. 2011) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1617, 275 (9th ed. 2009)). Thus, the collection agency’s
strategy in seeking the writ was not to obtain personal property to satisfy the
judgment, but to acquire the rights to Arelleno’s FDCPA lawsuit against the
agency so it could have it dismissed.
The
justice court granted the writ, which directed the Clark County Sheriff “to
satisfy this judgment with interest and costs as provided by law, out of the
personal property of the
judgment debtor.” The writ described the targeted property as all “claims for
relief, causes of action, things in action, and choses in action in any lawsuit
pending in Nevada including, the rights of Patricia Arellano, in the civil
action” pending against the collection agency and its lawyers.
Thereafter,
pursuant to the writ of execution, the sheriff sold Arellano’s lawsuit in an
auction sale on the Clark County courthouse steps. Clark County Collection
Services bought the claims against itself for $250.
After
buying Arellano’s lawsuit, the collection agency moved in federal district
court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Arellano “no longer possesse[d] any
rights of action in this case, and no longer possesse[d] any standing to sue.”
The
district court dismissed Arellano’s cause of action.
II
State
law can be preempted in three circumstances pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. English
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 723, 78 (1990). Only the third
circumstance is relevant here: “state law is pre-empted to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law.” Id.
At 79. This conflict occurs when “the
operation of state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’” In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974)), or when it
“interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach
[its] goal,” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 497 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). In other words, state law is
preempted when “under the circumstances of the particular case,” it stands as
an obstacle to Congressional purpose “—whether that ‘obstacle’ goes by the
name of ‘conflicting; contrary to; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability;
inconsistency; violation; curtailment; interference,’ or the like.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (alterations omitted) (quoting Hinesv. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Federalism
requires that we assume federal law was not intended to supersede the states’
historic police powers “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2188 (2014).
Although
we read even express preemption provisions narrowly, a state cannot avoid
compliance with a federal regime “merely by relying upon a connection to an
area of traditional state regulation.” Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. 627, 1400 (2013).1
A
“[T]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). “The FDCPA was enacted as a
broad remedial statute designed to ‘eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.’” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin.
Servs., LLC,660 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). The Act’s purpose is “to protect vulnerable and unsophisticated
debtors from abuse, harassment, and deceptive debt collection practices.” Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions,
LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 938 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing S. Rep. 95–389, at 2, 4 (1977), as
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696, 1699).
And the “FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd . . .
the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” Clark v. Capital Credit &
Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d
1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318–19 (2d Cir. 1993)).
In
order to achieve these goals, the Act regulates communication between debt
collectors and debtors, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, c, g, and creates a federal cause
of action for debtors under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Debt collectors may be subject
to civil liability for engaging in harassment or abuse, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d,
making false or misleading representations of various sorts, 15 U.S.C. §§
1692e, j, or engaging in unfair practices while attempting to collect debt, 15
U.S.C. § 1692f.
The
FDCPA also includes an express preemption and savings clause:
This subchapter does not annul, alter,
or
affect, or exempt any person subject to
the
provisions of this subchapter from
complying
with the laws of any State with respect
to debt
collection practices, except to the
extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any
provision
of this subchapter, and then only to
the extent
of the inconsistency. For purposes of
this
section, a State law is not
inconsistent with
this subchapter if the protection such
law
affords any consumer is greater than
the
protection provided by this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
To
enforce the FDCPA, Congress chose “a private attorney general approach.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that it was “Congress’s
intent that the Act should be enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys
general.”). “Prevailing plaintiffs . . . are entitled to actual damages, statutory
damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.” Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1061 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)).
B
The
collection agency argues that because the FDCPA does not speak directly to the
execution of claims, there can be no federal preemption. This argument denies
the existence of conflict preemption. “And conflict preemption . . . turns on
the identification of ‘actual conflict,’ and not on an express statement of
pre-emptive intent.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 884. Indeed, “the Court has never before
required a specific, formal agency statement identifying conflict in order to conclude
that such a conflict in fact exists.” Id.
Where
the Act “itself does not speak directly to the issue, the Court must be guided
by the goals and policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact
pre-empts an action based on the law of an affected State.” Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 493. Just as in International Paper Co., the federal law in question directly regulates the
substantive law at issue (debt collection practices) and specifically empowers
debtors to bring suit against debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i; see Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 495 (holding that Vermont nuisance law was
preempted to the extent that it conflicted with water pollution standards set
forth in the Clean Water Act). And while the Act itself need not “speak
directly to the issue,” Int’l
Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 493, the FDCPA does
expressly preempt state laws “to the extent that those laws are inconsistent
with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
In
addition to evading liability and preventing Arellano from pursuing her
potential federal claims, the collection agency has literally used the
execution mechanism to collect
debt
from Arellano, and argues that she “has received the benefit of [the $250]
reduction in her judgment.” But a debt collector cannot be allowed to use state
law strategically to execute on a debtor’s FDCPA claims against it under the guise
of legitimate debt collection. Though the FDCPA does preserve debt collectors’
rights to collect what they are owed, the Act does not “authorize the bringing
of legal actions by debt collectors.” See
15 U.S.C. § 1692i(b). Debt collectors cannot
evade the restrictions of the Act by forcing a debtor’s claims to be auctioned,
acquiring the claims, and dismissing them. To allow otherwise would thwart
enforcement of
the
FDCPA and undermine its purpose. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k, l.
C
Resolving
this case does not require any additional or supplemental rule beyond the text
of the Act. A state remedy of execution cannot be used for the purpose of
avoiding the impact of federal law. Therefore, we reverse the district court,
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion, holding that federal
law preempts a private party’s use of state execution procedures to acquire and
destroy a debtor’s FDCPA claims against it. We need not, and do not, reach any
other issue urged by the parties.
REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA ARELLANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CLARK COUNTY COLLECTION
SERVICE, LLC; BORG LAW GROUP,
LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-15467
D.C. No.
2:15-cv-01424-
JAD-NJK
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2017
Pasadena, California
Filed November 17, 2017
Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Stephen
Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, and Edward R. Korman,*
District Judge.
Opinion by Chief Judge Thomas
* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. 2 COLLECTION SERV.
SUMMARY**
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of an
action brought against a debt collector under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.
The panel held that a debt collector cannot avoid liability
under the FDCPA by obtaining the debtor’s lawsuit through
a state court writ of execution. The panel concluded that such
a procedure frustrates the Act’s purpose and is thus conflictpreempted.
The panel remanded the case for further
proceedings.
COUNSEL
Deepak Gupta (argued), Richard J. Rubin, and Neil K.
Sawhney, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Keren E.
Gesund, Gesund & Pailet LLC, Las Vegas, Nevada; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Patrick J. Reilly (argued), Holland & Hart LLP, Las Vegas,
Nevada, for Defendants-Appellees.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. COLLECTION SERV. 3
OPINION
THOMAS, Chief Judge:
Can a debt collector avoid liability under the Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act by obtaining the debtor’s
lawsuit through a writ of execution? We conclude that such
a procedure frustrates the Act’s purpose and is thus
preempted.
I
Patricia Arellano was overdue on a small amount of
medical debt—$371.89 to be precise. A private collection
agency, Clark County Collection Services, sent her a letter
about it. Included with the letter was a summons and state
justice court complaint seeking collection of the debt. The
complaint itself stated that Arellano could “[d]ispute the
validity of this debt” within 30 days, but that failing to do so
would result in a presumption of validity. However,
separately, in small print, the summons indicated that to
defend the lawsuit, Arellano must file a formal written
response with the court within 20 days.
Arellano did not file a response, and the collection agency
obtained a default judgment against her in justice court for
$793.39. The debt had doubled in the intervening month
because it now included costs, pre-judgment interest, and
attorney fees.
Subsequently, Arellano filed suit against the collection
agency and its law firm under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA” or “the Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq. She claimed that they had engaged in misleading
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. 4 COLLECTION SERV.
practices under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1) by stating that the
debtor could dispute the debt within 30 days of receipt, when
the actual summons required the filing of an answer in court
within 20 days. She further alleged that Clark County
Collection Services’ name impermissibly implied affiliation
with the Clark County government, violating 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(1).
The collection agency countered with a bold gambit.
Armed with its default judgment, it requested the justice court
to issue a writ of execution against Arellano in the amount of
$826.72, an increased amount reflecting additional costs.
Like most states, Nevada allows courts to authorize a sheriff
to levy on the property of a judgment debtor to satisfy a
judgment. Butwinick v. Hepner, 291 P.3d 119, 121 (Nev.
2012). With some exceptions not relevant here, the property
subject to a writ of execution in Nevada includes a “right to
bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing.” Gallegos
v. Malco Enters. of Nev., 255 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Nev. 2011)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1617, 275 (9th ed. 2009)).
Thus, the collection agency’s strategy in seeking the writ
was not to obtain personal property to satisfy the judgment,
but to acquire the rights to Arelleno’s FDCPA lawsuit against
the agency so it could have it dismissed.
The justice court granted the writ, which directed the
Clark County Sheriff “to satisfy this judgment with interest
and costs as provided by law, out of the personal property of
the judgment debtor.” The writ described the targeted
property as all “claims for relief, causes of action, things in
action, and choses in action in any lawsuit pending in Nevada
including, the rights of Patricia Arellano, in the civil action”
pending against the collection agency and its lawyers.
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. COLLECTION SERV. 5
Thereafter, pursuant to the writ of execution, the sheriff
sold Arellano’s lawsuit in an auction sale on the Clark County
courthouse steps. Clark County Collection Services bought
the claims against itself for $250.
After buying Arellano’s lawsuit, the collection agency
moved in federal district court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing
that Arellano “no longer possesse[d] any rights of action in
this case, and no longer possesse[d] any standing to sue.”
The district court dismissed Arellano’s cause of action.
II
State law can be preempted in three circumstances
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 723, 78 (1990). Only the
third circumstance is relevant here: “state law is pre-empted
to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.” Id. at
79. This conflict occurs when “the operation of state law
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’” In re
Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 479 (1974)), or when it “interferes with the methods by
which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal,”
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 497 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). In
other words, state law is preempted when “under the
circumstances of the particular case,” it stands as an obstacle
to Congressional purpose “—whether that ‘obstacle’ goes by
the name of ‘conflicting; contrary to; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment;
interference,’ or the like.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (alterations omitted) (quoting Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. 6 COLLECTION SERV.
Federalism requires that we assume federal law was not
intended to supersede the states’ historic police powers
“unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2188 (2014).
Although we read even express preemption provisions
narrowly, a state cannot avoid compliance with a federal
regime “merely by relying upon a connection to an area of
traditional state regulation.” Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. 627,
1400 (2013).1
A
“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S.
70, 76 (2008) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)). “The FDCPA was enacted as a broad remedial
statute designed to ‘eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses.’” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC,
1 In Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997), the Supreme Court
analyzed the intersection of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and Louisiana’s community property law. That
case illustrates both the potential for narrow preemption as well as the
primacy of federal law even in areas of traditional state regulation.
Simply finding a conflict between the two legal regimes was sufficient to
resolve the case in favor of preemption. Id. at 841. But, of course,
preemption only applied insofar as the community property law elevated
a descendant’s property interest over an ERISA plan participant’s interest
in a way that was incongruous with Congress’s intention to preserve the
economic security of a surviving spouse. See id. at 843–44. In the same
way, preemption in this case applies only to Nevada’s claim execution law
insofar as it permits debt collectors to execute on FDCPA claims.
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. COLLECTION SERV. 7
660 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692(e)). The Act’s purpose is “to protect vulnerable and
unsophisticated debtors from abuse, harassment, and
deceptive debt collection practices.” Guerrero v. RJM
Acquisitions, LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 938 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
S. Rep. 95–389, at 2, 4 (1977), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696, 1699). And the “FDCPA protects
all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd . . . the
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” Clark v. Capital
Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314,
1318–19 (2d Cir. 1993)).
In order to achieve these goals, the Act regulates
communication between debt collectors and debtors,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, c, g, and creates a federal cause of action
for debtors under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Debt collectors may be
subject to civil liability for engaging in harassment or abuse,
15 U.S.C. § 1692d, making false or misleading
representations of various sorts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, j, or
engaging in unfair practices while attempting to collect debt,
15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The FDCPA also includes an express
preemption and savings clause:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or
affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this subchapter from complying
with the laws of any State with respect to debt
collection practices, except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any provision
of this subchapter, and then only to the extent
of the inconsistency. For purposes of this
section, a State law is not inconsistent with
this subchapter if the protection such law
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. 8 COLLECTION SERV.
affords any consumer is greater than the
protection provided by this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
To enforce the FDCPA, Congress chose “a private
attorney general approach.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin.,
Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tolentino v.
Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also
Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991)
(noting that it was “Congress’s intent that the Act should be
enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys general.”).
“Prevailing plaintiffs . . . are entitled to actual damages,
statutory damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.” Gonzales,
660 F.3d at 1061 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)).
B
The collection agency argues that because the FDCPA
does not speak directly to the execution of claims, there can
be no federal preemption. This argument denies the existence
of conflict preemption. “And conflict preemption . . . turns
on the identification of ‘actual conflict,’ and not on an
express statement of pre-emptive intent.” Geier, 529 U.S. at
884. Indeed, “the Court has never before required a specific,
formal agency statement identifying conflict in order to
conclude that such a conflict in fact exists.” Id.
Where the Act “itself does not speak directly to the issue,
the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of the Act
in determining whether it in fact pre-empts an action based on
the law of an affected State.” Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at
493. Just as in International Paper Co., the federal law in
question directly regulates the substantive law at issue (debt
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. COLLECTION SERV. 9
collection practices) and specifically empowers debtors to
bring suit against debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i; see Int’l
Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 495 (holding that Vermont nuisance
law was preempted to the extent that it conflicted with water
pollution standards set forth in the Clean Water Act). And
while the Act itself need not “speak directly to the issue,”
Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 493, the FDCPA does expressly
preempt state laws “to the extent that those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then
only to the extent of the inconsistency,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
In addition to evading liability and preventing Arellano
from pursuing her potential federal claims, the collection
agency has literally used the execution mechanism to collect
debt from Arellano, and argues that she “has received the
benefit of [the $250] reduction in her judgment.” But a debt
collector cannot be allowed to use state law strategically to
execute on a debtor’s FDCPA claims against it under the
guise of legitimate debt collection. Though the FDCPA does
preserve debt collectors’ rights to collect what they are owed,
the Act does not “authorize the bringing of legal actions by
debt collectors.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(b). Debt collectors
cannot evade the restrictions of the Act by forcing a debtor’s
claims to be auctioned, acquiring the claims, and dismissing
them. To allow otherwise would thwart enforcement of
the FDCPA and undermine its purpose. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692k, l.
C
Resolving this case does not require any additional or
supplemental rule beyond the text of the Act. A state remedy
of execution cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding the
impact of federal law. Therefore, we reverse the district
ARELLANO V. CLARK CTY. 10 COLLECTION SERV.
court, and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion, holding that federal law preempts a private party’s
use of state execution procedures to acquire and destroy a
debtor’s FDCPA claims against it. We need not, and do not,
reach any other issue urged by the parties.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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