THE CASE OF THE SCAMMED ATTORNEY:
WHO SHOULD BEAR THE RISK AND LOSS - BANK OR BANK CUSTOMER?
The legal issue in the case centered on the definition of “collected balance” in the wire transfer agreement between the attorney and the bank, and whether the attorney could avoid the overdraft created by the charge-back because the bank executed the wire transfer based on provisional settlement funds that the bank had credited to the attorney’s account (making them part of the available balance), but had not yet, in fact, collected.
The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against the bank on cross-motions for summary judgment, and the majority affirmed. But one justice dissented, charging the majority with contravening “the established rule of law that the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC) preempts common-law claims and defenses that conflict with established principles of banking and commercial law.”). The dissenting justice would have reversed the trial court and rendered judgment for Cadence based on UCC preemption of common-law defenses to a bank’s right to charge back provisional settlement funds.
The attorney argued that Cadence breached its duty, as set out in the wire-transfer agreement, by transferring funds without verifying whether the funds came from a verified “collected balance” and that the wire transfer agreement was the relevant agreement for analyzing the bank’s claim. If Cadence had done the proper verification, it would have discovered that sufficient funds were not available to execute the wire transfer, and the bank would not have suffered any loss when the deposited check was later returned unpaid because it would simply have reversed the provisional credit to the IOLTA account.
To the dissenting justice’s chagrin, the majority agreed with the attorney that Cadence “breached the parties’ wire transfer agreement, thereby causing the overdraft and entitling Elizondo to offset the chargeback by the amount of overdrawn funds.” It rejected the argument that the UCC preempts Elizondo’s affirmative defense of the right to an offset based on Cadence’s breach of the subsequent wire transfer agreement.
Since January 1, 2019, the composition of the previously all-Republican First Court of Appeals is mixed, but in this case two long-time Republican incumbents faced off against each other. Only one of the justices on the three-member panel was elected in the Democratic sweep in November 2018. She did not write an opinion, but was in effect the swing vote between the author of the majority opinion (Laura Carter Higley) and the dissent (Evelyn V. Keyes) in this dispute over the application of the UCC and state contract law. There is a good chance the case will be taken to the Texas Supreme Court if the panel’s 2:1 disposition is not undone by the nine-member intermediate court of appeals sitting en banc.
EXCERPT FOR MAJORITY OPINION
In this appeal from a take-nothing judgment, the principal issue is who is
liable for funds that were wire transferred from an attorney’s IOLTA account to a
third-party account overseas: the attorney or the bank? Attorney Roy J. Elizondo
III and his firm, Roy J. Elizondo III, PLLC (collectively, “Elizondo”) unwittingly
deposited a counterfeit check into Elizondo’s IOLTA account with Cadence Bank,
N.A., and Cadence credited the account with provisional settlement funds.
Elizondo then requested that Cadence wire transfer funds from his IOLTA account
to a third-party account overseas, and the parties executed a wire transfer
agreement under which Cadence agreed to transfer the funds from a “verified
collected balance.” Cadence wire transferred the funds from Elizondo’s account,
but it did not verify whether the funds came from a collected balance. The drawee
bank then dishonored the counterfeit check, and Cadence charged back Elizondo’s
account, resulting in an overdraft.
Cadence sued Elizondo to recover the overdrawn funds, asserting claims for
breach of the parties’ underlying deposit agreement and breach of warranty under
the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 4.207. The
parties filed cross-dispositive motions, and the trial court entered judgment for
Elizondo. We hold that, by depositing the counterfeit check, Elizondo breached the
parties’ deposit agreement and UCC transfer warranties, thereby entitling Cadence
to charge back the provisional settlement funds. See id. § 4.214(a). However, we
further hold that, by failing to transfer the funds from a “verified collected
balance,” Cadence subsequently breached the parties’ wire transfer agreement,
thereby causing the overdraft and entitling Elizondo to offset the chargeback by the
amount of overdrawn funds. Therefore, we affirm.
[...]
We hold that Cadence’s breach of the wire transfer agreement entitled
Elizondo to offset Cadence’s chargeback by the amount of the overdrawn funds as
a matter of law.
* * *In sum, Elizondo breached the UCC and the parties’ Deposit Agreement by
depositing the counterfeit check into his IOLTA bank account. Elizondo and
Cadence then entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to wire transfer funds
from Elizondo’s account. The agreement required Cadence to wire transfer the
funds from a “verified collected balance.” Cadence breached the agreement by
making the transfer using the provisional settlement funds credited to Elizondo’s
account for the unpaid, counterfeit check. Had Cadence not breached the
agreement, the chargeback made by Cadence to Elizondo’s account would not
have resulted in an overdraft. Thus, although Cadence had the right under the UCC
and the Deposit Agreement to charge back the provisional settlement funds,
Elizondo was entitled to offset the chargeback by the amount of the overdrawn
funds, thereby negating Cadence’s alleged damages. We hold that the trial court
did not err in granting Elizondo’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we
overrule Cadence’s two issues..
Cadence Bank v. Roy J. Elizondo III, and Roy J. Elizondo III PLLC, No. 01-17-00886-CV (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] May 16, 2019, no pet. h) (majority opinion)(dissenting opinion).
Opinion issued May 16, 2019In TheCourt of AppealsFor TheFirst District of Texas————————————NO. 01-17-00886-CV———————————CADENCE BANK, AppellantV.ROY J. ELIZONDO III AND ROY J. ELIZONDO III PLLC, AppelleesOn Appeal from the 234th District CourtHarris County, TexasTrial Court Case No. 2014-65226
DISSENTING OPINIONI respectfully dissent. In this suit, appellant Cadence Bank sued appellee Roy
J. Elizondo III and his law firm, Roy J. Elizondo III PLLC, to recover funds
charged back to Elizondo by the bank when a cashier’s check was dishonored that
Elizondo had deposited and from which he had directed that funds be wire-
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transferred to a foreign third party during the provisional settlement period. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Elizondo on common-law
counterclaims and defenses he asserted against the bank in cross-motions for
summary judgment. Cadence has appealed. The majority affirms. I would not.
The majority opinion contravenes the established rule of law that the
Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC) preempts common-law claims and defenses
that conflict with established principles of banking and commercial law. I agree
with the majority that Elizondo breached both his deposit agreement with Cadence
Bank (the Deposit Agreement) and the warranty he gave the bank pursuant to the
UCC that the cashier’s check he had deposited into his IOLTA account at the bank
was good when he directed Cadence to transfer funds from his account to a foreign
entity during the provisional settlement period. I do not agree with the majority
that the wire transfer form, which stated that the funds had been transferred from a
“verified collected balance,” represented a separate and superseding agreement
between Elizondo and Cadence in which Cadence made a false representation to
Elizondo that overrode Cadence’s right under the UCC to charge the funds back to
Elizondo.
I would render judgment for Cadence.
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Facts
This case is governed by the UCC and by Elizondo’s Deposit Agreement
with Cadence.
Section 4.214 of the UCC provides:
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer
for an item and fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of payments
by a bank, or otherwise to receive settlement for the item that is or
becomes final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge
back the amount of any credit given for the item to its customer’s
account, or obtain refund from its customer, whether or not it is able
to return the item, if by its midnight deadline or within a longer
reasonable time after it learns the facts it returns the item or sends
notification of the facts.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.214(a) (emphasis added).
Section 4.207(a) of the UCC provides, “A customer or collecting bank that
transfers an item and receives a settlement or other consideration warrants to the
transferee and to any subsequent collecting bank that . . . the warrantor is a person
entitled to enforce the item” and that “all signatures on the item are authentic and
authorized.” Id. § 4.207(a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). Section 4.207(b) provides, “If
an item is dishonored, a customer or collecting bank transferring the item and
receiving settlement or other consideration is obliged to pay the amount due on the
item (i) according to the terms of the item at the time it was transferred . . . .” Id.
§ 4.207(b). Finally, section 4.207(c) provides, “A person to whom the warranties
under Subsection (a) are made and who took the item in good faith may recover
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from the warrantor as damages for breach of warranty an amount equal to the loss
suffered as a result of the breach . . . .” Id. § 4.207(c) (emphasis added). All of
these provisions apply here.
Section 4.201 of the UCC further provides that “[u]nless a contrary intent
clearly appears and before the time that a settlement given by a collecting bank for
an item becomes final, the bank, with respect to the item, is an agent or sub-agent
of the owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional. This
provision applies . . . even though credit given for the item is subject to immediate
withdrawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn . . . .” Id. § 4.201(a) (emphasis
added). However, “the continuance of ownership of an item by its owner and any
rights of the owner to proceeds of the item are subject to rights of a collecting
bank, such as those resulting from outstanding advances on the item and rights of
recoupment or setoff.” Id.
Elizondo and his law firm, Roy J. Elizondo III, PLLC (collectively,
“Elizondo”), maintained an IOLTA account with Cadence Bank. The Deposit
Agreement signed by Elizondo and Cadence expressly affirmed the plain language
of the UCC. The Deposit Agreement specifically provided that any item accepted
for deposit “may be subject to later verification and final payment” and that
Cadence may “deduct funds from your account if an item is . . . returned to us
unpaid . . . even if you have already used the funds.” The Deposit Agreement also
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stated, “Credit for any item we accept for deposit to your account . . . is provisional
and may be revoked if the item is not finally paid, for any reason, in cash or its
equivalent.” This provision of his Deposit Agreement with Cadence expressed
Elizondo’s understanding that the requirements of UCC sections 4.214(a), 4.207,
and 4.201 applied.
The summary judgment record shows that it was Cadence’s policy to
provide a provisional credit pending final settlement of the check deposited by
Elizondo and that Elizondo knowingly ordered funds to be transferred to a
Japanese account during the period when the funds were only provisionally
credited to his account. These practices complied with the UCC.
On Friday, September 19, 2014, a cashier’s check was delivered to
Elizondo’s office, just as a putative new client Elizondo had never met in person
said it would be. The check was payable to Elizondo in the amount of $496,850
and drawn on JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Elizondo deposited the check into his
IOLTA account with Cadence, and Cadence credited the account with provisional
settlement funds.
On Tuesday, Elizondo contacted Cadence employee Shannon Yang-Oh and
informed her that he needed to wire transfer a portion of the funds in his account to
a third-party account in Japan. He sent Oh an email with the pertinent information,
including the name of the receiving bank, the name of the beneficiary, and the
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amount to be wired: $398,980. Oh informed Elizondo that she would “prepare [a]
wire form and send it to [Elizondo] for a signature.”
Oh emailed a wire transfer request form to Elizondo. The top half of the
form consisted of fields already filled in with the information that Elizondo had
provided Oh in his earlier email. The form included a signature box for Elizondo
and a declaration stating:
I understand that the bank makes no guarantees concerning the
delivery of international wires. I also understand that I will be
responsible for tracer fees if a problem arises or if the funds are
returned. I will accept the net proceeds. I have been made aware that
this process may take up to 10 business days.
The bottom half of the form contained blank fields to be filled in by Cadence
after Elizondo had signed and submitted the form to the bank. These blank fields
included a field for the amount of the “collected balance” in the account from
which the wire transfer would be made and a field for the name of the “employee
who verified [the] collected balance.” Elizondo signed and emailed the form back
to Oh. Oh then filled out and signed the two “collected balance” fields, indicating
that the wire transfer would be made from a “collected balance” in the account of
$497,643.89. Another Cadence employee, Sharita Baker, wrote in the margins of
the form that $497,643.89 was Elizondo’s “available balance,” a term defined by
the Deposit Agreement to mean the amount “available for immediate withdrawal.”
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Finally, Assistant Branch Manager Yolanda Villatoro signed the form as the
approving officer.
Cadence employees testified by deposition that when they complete a wire
transfer form, or otherwise provide information regarding account balances, they
rely on the amount that is reflected in Cadence’s computer system, and the
“collected balance” in the computer system represents the end-of-day ledger
balance, minus any debits, plus any credits from the previous day. Thus,
“Collected funds is just a term that is used to identify a particular field within our
system.” This collected balance can include a provisional credit for a deposited
check when any holds have been removed but the check still has not been finally
paid. That was the case here. Moreover, both the deposit slip and the deposit
receipt clearly disclosed that the deposit could be returned and was subject to the
provisions of the UCC. And Elizondo’s Deposit Agreement contained his express
acknowledgement that any item accepted for deposit “may be subject to later
verification and final payment” and that Cadence may “deduct funds from your
account if an item is . . . returned to us unpaid . . . even if you have already used
the funds.”
On Wednesday, September 24, Cadence wire transferred $398,980 to the
Japanese bank account using the provisional settlement funds that Cadence had
credited to Elizondo’s account. The cashier’s check was subsequently dishonored
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by Chase and returned to Cadence unpaid. Cadence notified Elizondo that the
check had been dishonored, and it charged back the amount that had been
provisionally credited to his account, resulting in a negative account balance of
$398,980.
Cadence demanded that Elizondo repay the overdrawn funds. When
Elizondo refused, Cadence sued Elizondo to recover the overdrawn funds,
asserting claims for breach of Elizondo’s Deposit Agreement and breach of
warranty under the Texas UCC. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.207(a); see
also id. §§ 4.201(a), 4.207(b)–(c), 4.214(a).
Elizondo raised defenses and filed a counterclaim against Cadence, alleging
common-law causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation,
and fraud. He based his claims and defenses on the statement in the wire transfer
request form that the funds were transferred from “a verified collected balance,”
arguing that the balance had not yet been “collected” as Elizondo was using the
term, although the validity of the check had been provisionally verified by
Elizondo himself, the bank had provisionally deposited the funds into his account,
and these practices were fully compliant with the UCC provisions permitting a
bank to charge back to its customer funds ordered transferred from the account by
the customer during the provisional settlement period.
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The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court
entered judgment for Elizondo.
Analysis
A. Arguments of the parties
Cadence argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment because the evidence proves as a matter of law that Elizondo is liable for
breach of warranty under the UCC and for breach of the parties’ Deposit
Agreement. Specifically, Cadence contends that by depositing a counterfeit check
into his bank account Elizondo breached his warranties to Cadence under UCC
section 4.207 that he was “entitled to enforce” the cashier’s check he deposited and
that “all signatures” on the check were “authentic and authorized.” See id.
§ 4.207(a)(1)–(2). Cadence further contends that because it took the check “in
good faith” it was entitled under section 4.207(c) to recover from Elizondo as
damages the amount of the overdraft plus expenses. See id. § 4.207(c) (providing
that warrantee who takes item in good faith may recover as damages amount equal
to loss suffered from breach plus expenses).
Cadence further contends that it is entitled to charge back the provisional
credit to Elizondo’s account and to obtain a refund in the amount of the counterfeit
check under UCC sections 4.201 and 4.214 and Article E, Sections 1, 2, and 14 of
the Deposit Agreement with Elizondo. See id. § 4.201(a) (providing that bank
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receives check as customer’s agent and that settlement for check is provisional); id.
§ 4.214(a) (providing bank’s right to charge back provisional settlement for
dishonored check). Finally, Cadence contends that the UCC, supplemented by the
Deposit Agreement, preempts Elizondo’s common-law claims and defenses. Thus,
Cadence contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment
on its claims for breach of warranty and breach of contract.
Elizondo does not dispute that he breached the transfer warranties of section
4.207 by depositing the counterfeit check. Nor does he dispute that the UCC and
the Deposit Agreement entitle Cadence to charge back provisional settlement funds
credited to an account for a check that is deposited but later dishonored by the
drawee. However, Elizondo argues that his breaches did not cause Cadence’s
damages; they were caused by Cadence’s superseding breach by representing the
transferred funds on the transfer form as transferred from a “verified collected
balance” during the provisional settlement period; therefore, Cadence is not
entitled to recover the overdraft resulting from the charge-back in this case.
Accepting Elizondo’s argument upends the carefully articulated terms of the
UCC and the Deposit Agreement set out above in direct contravention of
controlling law. Accordingly, I dissent.
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B. Applicable law
Under Texas law, the UCC regulates a bank’s relationship with its Texas
customers. See generally id. §§ 3.101–.605 (negotiable instruments); id. §§ 4.101–
.504 (bank deposits and collections); id. §§ 4A.101–.507 (funds transfers). “The
relationship may also be governed in part by agreements between the bank and its
customer, such as an agreement governing the processing of negotiable instruments
presented to the bank.” Contractors Source, Inc. v. Amegy Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 462
S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
The UCC “contains a comprehensive and carefully considered allocation of
responsibility among parties to banking relationships.” Sw. Bank v. Info. Support
Concepts, Inc., 149 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. 2004). It “must be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.103(a). Those purposes and polices are “(1) to simplify, clarify and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.” Id.; see
Sw. Bank, 149 S.W.3d at 110.
The UCC also provides, “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this title, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement [the UCC’s]
provisions.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103(b). However, “while principles
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of common law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, they may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies
those provisions reflect, unless a specific provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides otherwise.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103 cmt. 2 (emphasis
in original)1
; see Contractors Source, 462 S.W.3d at 138 (“To the extent they do
not conflict with the Uniform Commercial Code’s provisions, common law
principles complement the Uniform Commercial Code.”) (quoting Plano Lincoln
Mercury, Inc. v. Roberts, 167 S.W.3d 616, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).
Thus, unless a specific provision of the UCC provides otherwise, the UCC
“preempts principles of common law and equity that are inconsistent with either its
provisions or its purposes and policies.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103
cmt. 2. The UCC’s preemptive effect “extends to displacement of other law that is
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code, as
well as with its text.” Id.
Chapter 4 of the UCC establishes the rights and duties between banks and
their customers regarding deposits and collections. See id. §§ 4.101–.504; Am.
Airlines Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tex. 2000).
1 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently observed, “The UCC official
commentary is an authoritative interpretation of the Code.” Jones v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 960 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012). “Barring a contrary
interpretation from the Texas courts, we are guided by the official commentary.”
Id.
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Chapter 4 imposes certain warranty obligations on customers who deposit checks
drawn on other banks, establishes the circumstances under which settlements for
such checks are provisional, and gives banks the right to charge back such
settlements in the event that the check is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Section 4.207 of the UCC imposes the warranty obligations. Under section
4.207, when a customer deposits a check into his bank account and receives a
settlement or other consideration for the check, he makes certain warranties to the
bank. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.207(a). Those warranties include that the
customer is “a person entitled to enforce the item” and that “all signatures on the
item are authentic and authorized.” Id. § 4.207(a)(1)–(2). These warranties “cannot
be disclaimed with respect to checks.” Id. § 4.207(d). If the customer breaches
these warranties, a bank that took the check “in good faith” may recover from the
customer as damages “an amount equal to the loss suffered as a result of the
breach, but not more than the amount of the item plus expenses and loss of interest
incurred as a result of the breach.” Id. § 4.207(c).
Section 4.201 establishes the provisional status of settlements. Under section
4.201, when a bank collects on a check deposited by its customer, the bank acts as
the customer’s agent. Id. § 4.201(a). Unless a contrary intent clearly appears, any
settlement given for the check is provisional until the settlement becomes final. Id.
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Section 4.201 applies even if credit given for the check is subject to immediate
withdrawal or is in fact withdrawn. Id.
Section 4.214 establishes a bank’s right of charge-back. Under Section
4.214, if a customer deposits a check into his bank account and the bank credits the
customer’s account with provisional settlement funds, the bank may revoke the
settlement and charge back the account if the check is later dishonored by the
drawee. Id. § 4.214(a).
Finally, section 4.103 of the UCC states, in relevant part, that “[t]he effect of
the provisions of this chapter may be varied by agreement.” Id. § 4.103(a). The
official comments explain that section 4.103 “confers blanket power to vary all
provisions of the Article by agreements of the ordinary kind.” Id. § 4.103 cmt. 2.
“The agreement may be direct, as between the owner and the depositary bank; or
indirect, as in the case in which the owner authorizes a particular type of procedure
and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to such authorization.” Id. As
applicable here, section 4.103 provides that the terms of the UCC may be varied by
a customer’s deposit account agreement with a bank. However, Elizondo’s Deposit
Agreement was in accord with all of these UCC provisions.
C. The UCC preempts Elizondo’s common-law and equitable
defenses
Contrary to Elizondo’s argument and the majority’s holding, principles of
common law and equity cannot alter the “comprehensive and carefully considered
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allocation of responsibility among parties to banking relationships.” See Am.
Dream Team, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 481 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2015, pet. denied) (citing Sw. Bank, 149 S.W.3d at 107, and Martin, 29 S.W.3d at
91). Accordingly, the UCC preempts common-law defenses to a bank’s right to
charge back provisional settlement funds. See, e.g., id. (holding that depositor’s
claim that charge back breached deposit agreement was preempted by UCC);
Avanta Fed. Credit Union v. Shupak, 223 P.3d 863, 871 (Mont. 2009) (holding that
credit union’s statutory charge-back rights were not subject to equitable estoppel).
The Texas courts have consistently followed this reasoning. See Martin, 29
S.W.3d at 91 (stating that UCC Chapter 4 establishes rights and duties between
banks and their customers regarding deposits and collections); Rodriguez v. NBC
Bank, 5 S.W.3d 756, 765 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (holding that
bank was entitled to charge item back to its customer’s account after payor bank
initially paid item but then subsequently reversed payment); Bill Hart Auto Sales,
Inc. v. Comerica Bank-Tex., 893 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1995, no
pet.) (holding that when customer “authorized the transfer of the funds from its
account, that authorization did not affect the Bank’s right to charge-back the
account for the provisional credit when the Bank failed to receive a settlement for
the item from the drawee bank”).
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Elizondo ignores the plain language of the UCC, as well as his Deposit
Agreement. He argues that the form requesting that funds be wire-transferred from
his account to a third-party account constituted a subsequent enforceable
agreement with Cadence. He contends that Cadence had a duty under the wiretransfer agreement to transfer the funds from a “verified collected balance”—
which he construes as funds that have actually been collected and their collection
verified, not funds that are only provisionally verified subject to settlement, in
accordance with the bank’s custom and practice and the UCC. He further claims
that Cadence breached its duty, as set out in the wire-transfer agreement, by
transferring funds without verifying whether the funds came from a “collected
balance.” He argues that if Cadence had fulfilled its duty and inquired into the
“collected balance” prior to the wire transfer, it would have determined that he
lacked sufficient funds in the account to complete the wire transfer and it would
not have allowed the wire transfer with provisional funds from a check that had not
been settled by Chase, the drawee bank. Elizondo contends that, if Cadence had
not honored his wire transfer request until after it had collected the settlement
funds from Chase, Cadence would simply have charged back the provisional credit
to Elizondo with no loss to Cadence. Therefore, Elizondo argues, Cadence’s
damages were the result of Cadence’s own actions. Elizondo also argues that
Cadence’s breach of the wire transfer agreement by completing the transfer with
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only provisionally collected funds entitle him to offset the charge-back by the
amount of the overdraft. The majority agrees with him.
This is not, however, how the law works, as it would nullify Elizondo’s
warranty that the funds represented by the cashier’s check were good, his knowing
request that the funds be transferred while only provisionally deemed collected, his
acceptance of the risk that the funds would not ultimately prove collectible from
Chase, and his agreement in the Deposit Agreement that, should the check be
dishonored by Chase, Cadence could charge the overdraft back to him. In other
words, Elizondo’s argument—which the majority accepts—contradicts the terms
of both the UCC and the Deposit Agreement he executed.
As the majority acknowledges, once the check was dishonored by Chase,
Cadence was entitled to charge back the provisional settlement funds. See Slip Op.
at 2 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.214(a)).
The majority, however, denies that section 4.214(a) controls this case,
holding that, “by failing to transfer the funds from a ‘verified collected balance,’”
as it uniquely defines that term, Cadence “breached the parties’ wire transfer
agreement, thereby causing the overdraft and entitling Elizondo to offset the
chargeback by the amount of overdrawn funds.” Slip Op. at 2. This holding is
contradictory to the plain language of both the UCC and the Deposit Agreement
and depends entirely upon Elizondo’s and the majority’s own construction of the
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term “verified collected balance,” which is contrary to that used by Cadence in its
ordinary course of business and is inconsistent with the purposes and text of both
the UCC and the Deposit Agreement set out above. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 1.103 cmt. 2 (“[W]hile principles of common law and equity may
supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be used to
supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect, unless
a specific provision of the Uniform Commercial Code provides otherwise.”).
Elizondo and the majority argue, however, that the UCC does not
necessarily preempt common-law defenses to a bank’s right to recover an overdraft
caused by a statutory charge back of provisional settlement funds. Slip Op. at 20.
Relying on its own construction of terms and common-law principles, the majority
“hold[s] that the parties entered into a valid, enforceable agreement to wire transfer
funds from Elizondo’s account to a third-party account in Japan and that the terms
of that agreement are set forth in the wire transfer request form.” Slip Op. at 24. It
then holds that Cadence breached the contract by signing the blank on the wiretransfer agreement Elizondo had returned to the bank which stated that the funds
were transferred from a “verified collected balance,” when the funds in Elizondo’s
account had not been verified as actually being in the account, as opposed to being
provisionally settled under Elizondo’s warranty, and that Cadence therefore must
bear the loss. See Slip Op. at 25–31. Notably, the only cases the majority cites in
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support of its holding that Elizondo’s claims against Cadence are not preempted by
the UCC are cases from other states based on a bank’s misrepresentation to its
customer, not to itself on a wire-transfer form. See Slip Op. at 20 (citing cases).
In reaching its holding, the majority does exactly what the UCC prohibits: it
relies on its own construction of terms and common-law principles that directly
contradict the principles and text of the UCC.
Not only does no provision of the UCC provide otherwise, the Deposit
Agreement Elizondo signed expressly affirms the plain language of section 4.214.
The Deposit Agreement specifically provides that any item accepted for deposit
“may be subject to later verification and final payment,” and Cadence may “deduct
funds from your account if an item is . . . returned to us unpaid . . . even if you
have already used the funds.” It also expressly states, “Credit for any item we
accept for deposit to your account . . . is provisional and may be revoked if the
item is not finally paid, for any reason, in cash or its equivalent,” and it was
Cadence’s policy to provide a provisional credit pending final settlement of the
check.
In Southwest Bank, a similar case, the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply
proportionate responsibility provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code by refusing to permit a bank to join an employee who deposited her
employer’s checks into her personal account at the bank as a responsible third
20
party in the employer’s conversion action against the bank. Id. at 104–05. The
court reasoned, “Were we to impose Texas’s proportionate responsibility scheme
on Revised Article 3 [of the UCC], parties litigating UCC-based conversion claims
in Texas would face a unique liability scheme, overriding the UCC’s express
purpose of furthering uniformity among the states.” Id. at 110. It further observed,
“[T]he UCC is ‘carefully integrated and intended as a uniform codification of
permanent character covering an entire ‘field’ of law, [and] is to be regarded as
particularly resistant to implied repeal.’” Id. at 111 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.104 cmt. 1).
The situation in Southwest Bank is analogous to that in this case. Yet here,
rather than following the Texas Supreme Court, the majority overrides UCC
sections 4.201, 4.207, and 4.214, allowing the bank to charge back to the customer
unpaid funds the customer ordered transferred during the time in which the funds
were only provisionally collected, and Elizondo’s Deposit Agreement expressly
acknowledging that right of the bank under the UCC.
21
Conclusion
I would hold that Cadence was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly,
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment for Cadence Bank.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.
Justice Keyes, dissenting.
Opinion issued May 16, 2019In TheCourt of AppealsFor TheFirst District of Texas————————————NO. 01-17-00886-CV———————————CADENCE BANK, AppellantV.ROY J. ELIZONDO III AND ROY J. ELIZONDO III PLLC, AppelleesOn Appeal from the 234th District CourtHarris County, TexasTrial Court Case No. 2014-65226
MAJORITY OPINIONIn this appeal from a take-nothing judgment, the principal issue is who is
liable for funds that were wire transferred from an attorney’s IOLTA account to a
third-party account overseas: the attorney or the bank? Attorney Roy J. Elizondo
III and his firm, Roy J. Elizondo III, PLLC (collectively, “Elizondo”) unwittingly
2
deposited a counterfeit check into Elizondo’s IOLTA account with Cadence Bank,
N.A., and Cadence credited the account with provisional settlement funds.
Elizondo then requested that Cadence wire transfer funds from his IOLTA account
to a third-party account overseas, and the parties executed a wire transfer
agreement under which Cadence agreed to transfer the funds from a “verified
collected balance.” Cadence wire transferred the funds from Elizondo’s account,
but it did not verify whether the funds came from a collected balance. The drawee
bank then dishonored the counterfeit check, and Cadence charged back Elizondo’s
account, resulting in an overdraft.
Cadence sued Elizondo to recover the overdrawn funds, asserting claims for
breach of the parties’ underlying deposit agreement and breach of warranty under
the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 4.207. The
parties filed cross-dispositive motions, and the trial court entered judgment for
Elizondo. We hold that, by depositing the counterfeit check, Elizondo breached the
parties’ deposit agreement and UCC transfer warranties, thereby entitling Cadence
to charge back the provisional settlement funds. See id. § 4.214(a). However, we
further hold that, by failing to transfer the funds from a “verified collected
balance,” Cadence subsequently breached the parties’ wire transfer agreement,
thereby causing the overdraft and entitling Elizondo to offset the chargeback by the
amount of overdrawn funds. Therefore, we affirm.
3
Background
The material facts are largely undisputed. Elizondo is a plaintiffs’ lawyer
who works in Houston. He has an IOLTA deposit account with Cadence Bank.1
The account is governed by a Deposit Account Agreement.
In September 2014, Elizondo fell victim to a sophisticated check-fraud
scam. A putative international client solicited Elizondo via email for representation
in a run-of-the-mill collection action. Elizondo agreed to represent the client, and,
almost immediately thereafter, the client informed Elizondo that the putative
debtor had agreed to settle. The client further informed Elizondo that the debtor
would mail him (Elizondo) a cashier’s check in the amount of the settlement. The
client instructed Elizondo to deposit the check into his IOLTA account and to wire
a portion of the funds to a third-party account in Japan. The client emphasized that
time was of the essence, explaining that the dispute with the debtor had disrupted
its cash-flow and caused it to fall into arrears with various entities with which it did
business, including the holder of the Japanese bank account.
1 For the lay reader, IOLTA stands for “Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts.”
IOLTA programs raise funds to provide legal services to indigent persons by
pooling interest from lawyer trust accounts. What is IOLTA?, IOLTA.ORG:
LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.iolta.org/what-isiolta.
4
On Friday, September 19, 2014, a cashier’s check was delivered to
Elizondo’s office, just as the putative client said it would. The check was payable
to Elizondo in the amount of $496,850 and drawn on JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
The following Monday, September 22, Elizondo deposited the check into his
Cadence bank account. That same day, Cadence provisionally credited Elizondo’s
account for the amount of the check.
On Tuesday, September 23, Elizondo contacted Cadence employee S. YangOh and informed her that he needed to wire transfer a portion of the funds in his
account to a third-party account in Japan. He sent Oh an email with the pertinent
information, including the name of the receiving bank, the name of the beneficiary,
and the amount to be wired ($398,980). Oh responded that she would “prepare [a]
wire form and send it to [Elizondo] for a signature.”
Later that day, Oh emailed Elizondo a wire transfer request form. The top
half of the form consisted of fields filled in with the information that Elizondo had
provided Oh in his earlier email. It included a signature box for Elizondo and a
declaration stating:
I understand that the bank makes no guarantees concerning the
delivery of international wires. I also understand that I will be
responsible for tracer fees if a problem arises or if the funds are
returned. I will accept the net proceeds. I have been made aware that
this process may take up to 10 business days.
5
The bottom half of the form included a field that listed Cadence’s fee for the
wire transfer as $55. The rest of the bottom half consisted of blank fields to be
filled in by Cadence after Elizondo had signed and submitted the form. As relevant
here, these included a field for the amount of the “collected balance” from which
the wire transfer would be made and a field for the name of the “employee who
verified [the] collected balance.” The form stated that these two fields “must be
filled in” by Cadence. The bottom half of the form also included a signature box
for the Cadence officer who approved the wire transfer. The form instructed the
officer as follows:
Before signing off, be sure you “know your customer” and have
verified the collected balance and documented any exception
approvals.
The form did not define “collected balance.”
Elizondo signed and emailed the form back to Oh. Oh then filled out and
signed the two “collected balance” fields, indicating that the transfer would be
made from a “collected balance” of $497,643.89. Oh did not verify whether
$497,643.89 had actually been deposited into Elizondo’s account or whether
payment had been received for the check Elizondo had deposited earlier that
Monday. Another Cadence employee, S. Baker, wrote in the margins of the form
that $497,643.89 was Elizondo’s “available balance,” a term defined by the
6
Deposit Agreement to mean the amount “available for immediate withdrawal.”
Assistant Branch Manager Y. Villatoro signed the form as the approving officer.
On Wednesday, September 24, Cadence wire transferred $398,980 to the
Japanese bank account using the provisional settlement funds that Cadence had
credited to Elizondo’s account on Monday.
On Thursday, September 25, the cashier’s check was dishonored by Chase
and returned to Cadence unpaid. Cadence notified Elizondo that the check had
been dishonored and charged back the amount that had been provisionally credited
to his account, resulting in a negative balance of $398,980. Cadence demanded that
Elizondo repay the overdrawn funds. Elizondo refused.
In November 2014, Cadence filed its original petition against Elizondo.
Cadence asserted claims for breach of contract based on the parties’ Deposit
Agreement and breach of warranty under Section 2.07 of the Texas UCC. Cadence
sought to recover the amount of the overdrawn funds ($398,980) plus fees and
costs.
Elizondo filed an answer, asserting a general denial and various affirmative
defenses, including the right to an offset. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. Elizondo also
asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract based the wire transfer request form,
arguing that Cadence had breached the parties’ agreement by failing to transfer the
funds from a “verified collected balance.”
7
In February 2017, Cadence filed a motion for summary judgment. Cadence
asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim
under three sections of the Deposit Agreement:
• Article E, Section 1, which provides that all items accepted for deposit are
subject to later verification and final payment and that credit for an item
accepted for deposit is provisional and may be revoked if the item is not
finally paid for any reason;
• Article E, Section 2, which provides that items delivered to Cadence for
deposit are received by Cadence as the agent of the account holder and at the
account holder’s risk; and
• Article E, Section 14, which provides that Cadence may charge back a
deposited item drawn on another bank if the item is returned to Cadence for
any reason.
Cadence argued that, because the counterfeit cashier’s check was returned
unpaid, the Deposit Agreement entitled Cadence to reverse the provisional credit to
Elizondo’s account and recover the overdrawn funds from Elizondo.
Cadence also asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment on its claim
for breach of warranty under Section 2.07 of the Texas UCC. Specifically,
Cadence asserted that, by depositing the counterfeit check, Elizondo breached his
warranties that “all signatures” on the check were “authentic and authorized” and
that “the person on whose account the item is drawn authorized the issuance of the
item in the amount for which the item is drawn.” TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 4.207(a)(2), (6). Cadence further asserted that, as a result of Elizondo’s
breaches, it was entitled to charge back the provisional credit and recover as
8
damages the amount of the overdraft. See id. §§ 4.207(c) (permitting warrantee to
recover as damages “an amount equal to the loss suffered as a result of the
breach”), 4.214 (permitting bank to charge back provisional settlement funds for
deposited check that is later dishonored by drawee).
Elizondo filed a response to Cadence’s motion for summary judgment. He
also filed his own motion for summary judgment on his breach-of-contract claim.
Elizondo asserted that the wire transfer request form was a valid, enforceable
contract that required the funds to be transferred from a “verified collected
balance.” Elizondo argued that Cadence breached the contract by transferring the
funds from a balance that consisted of provisional settlement funds from an unpaid
check. Elizondo further argued that Cadence’s breach caused the overdraft and
therefore entitled him to offset Cadence’s right to a chargeback by the amount of
the improperly transferred funds, resulting in zero damages to Cadence. Elizondo
supported his argument with the deposition testimony of his expert witness,
Kenneth Lehrer, who testified that a “collected balance” is an industry term that
refers to a “depositor’s balance minus deposited check in the process of collection,
i.e., minus checks that have not been actually paid by the paying bank.”
Cadence filed a response to Elizondo’s motion for summary judgment.
Cadence asserted that the wire transfer request form did not constitute a valid,
enforceable contract and that the only valid contract between the parties was the
9
Deposit Agreement. Cadence further asserted that Elizondo misconstrued the
meaning of “collected balance,” which, according to Cadence, does not necessarily
consist of funds that have actually been received and can include provisional funds
from unpaid checks. Cadence supported its construction of “collected balance”
with the deposition testimony of its corporate representative and branch
administration manager, J. Scott, who testified that Cadence has its own, internal
definition of “collected balance.” And under this internal definition, Scott testified,
a “collected balance” is “the end-of-day ledger balance less any debits plus any
credits from the previous day.” Scott further testified that the term “collected
funds” does not necessarily include funds from checks that have been paid but
rather simply refers to funds that are available for use.
Cadence further argued that, even if Elizondo had correctly construed
“collected balance,” Elizondo still bore the risk of loss for the transferred funds
because funds deposited into a bank account can be challenged for up to three
years after deposit. According to Cadence, “even if the check had been initially
paid by [Chase], nothing could have prevented [Chase] from bringing claims
against Cadence or Elizondo for up to three years in the future as a result of
[Elizondo’s] decision to negotiate and deposit a fraudulent and/or counterfeit
check.” Finally, Cadence argued that Elizondo’s defensive theory would lead to
absurd results: “if followed, [Elizondo’s] creative contractual interpretation theory
10
would mean that for every single wire transfer Cadence Bank made, it would no
longer seek to recover the money back from its own customer.”
The trial court held a hearing on Cadence’s and Elizondo’s motions for
summary judgment. After the hearing, the trial court denied Cadence’s motion,
granted Elizondo’s motion, and rendered a take-nothing judgment. Cadence
appeals.
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
In two issues, Cadence contends that the trial court erred in denying its
motion for summary judgment and in granting Elizondo’s motion for summary
judgment. According to Cadence, this case is governed by Chapter 4 of the UCC
and the parties’ Deposit Agreement. Cadence contends that it proved as a matter of
law that Elizondo is liable for breach of UCC transfer warranties and that Cadence
is entitled to reverse the provisional settlement funds credited to Elizondo’s
account and to recover as damages the amount of the resulting overdraft under both
the UCC and the Deposit Agreement. Cadence further contends that Elizondo’s
defenses are preempted by the UCC or otherwise fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact and that Elizondo failed to prove as a matter of law each element of
his claim for breach of contract.
Elizondo responds that the case is governed by the wire transfer request
form, which, according to Elizondo, constitutes a valid, enforceable contract that is
11
supported, not preempted, by the UCC. Elizondo contends that the contract
required Cadence to wire transfer the funds from a “verified collected balance” and
that Cadence breached the contract by transferring the funds using provisional
credit for an uncollected check. Elizondo further contends that Cadence’s breach
caused the overdraft to his account and therefore entitles him to offset Cadence’s
chargeback by the amount of the overdrawn funds. Because the offset negates
Cadence’s damages, Elizondo concludes, the trial court properly entered a takenothing judgment in his favor.
A. Standard of review
We review an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Charles R. Tips Family Tr. v. PB Commercial LLC, 459 S.W.3d 147, 152
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). When, as here, both parties moved
for summary judgment and the trial court granted one and denied the other, we
review the summary judgment evidence presented by each party, determine all
questions presented, and render judgment as the trial court should have rendered.
Id. We may affirm the judgment that the trial court rendered or reverse and render
the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Id.
12
B. Applicable law
1. The UCC governs banking relationships and preempts
inconsistent law
Under Texas law, the UCC regulates a bank’s relationship with its Texas
customers. See generally TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 3.101–.605 (negotiable
instruments); id. §§ 4.101–.504 (bank deposits and collections); id. §§ 4A.101–
.507 (funds transfers). “The relationship may also be governed in part by
agreements between the bank and its customer, such as an agreement governing the
processing of negotiable instruments presented to the bank.” Contractors Source,
Inc. v. Amegy Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 462 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
“The UCC contains a comprehensive and carefully considered allocation of
responsibility among parties to banking relationships.” Sw. Bank v. Info. Support
Concepts, Inc., 149 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. 2004). It “must be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 1.103(a). Those purposes and polices are “(1) to simplify, clarify and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.” Id.
“To the extent they do not conflict with the Uniform Commercial Code’s
provisions, common law principles complement the Uniform Commercial Code.”
13
Contractors Source, 462 S.W.3d at 138 (quoting Plano Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v.
Roberts, 167 S.W.3d 616, 624 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, no pet.)); see also TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE § 1.103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this title, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions.”).
“Therefore, while principles of common law and equity
may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be
used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions
reflect, unless a specific provision of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
otherwise.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 1.103 cmt 2.2 Unless a specific provision of
the UCC provides otherwise, the UCC “preempts principles of common law and
equity that are inconsistent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies.”
Id. The UCC’s preemptive effect “extends to displacement of other law that is
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code, as
well as with its text.” Id.
2. Chapter 4 of the UCC governs deposits and collections
Chapter 4 of the UCC establishes the rights and duties between banks and
their customers regarding deposits and collections. See id. §§ 4.101–.504; Am.
Airlines Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tex. 2000).
2
“The UCC official commentary is an authoritative interpretation of the Code.”
Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 960 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012). “Barring
a contrary interpretation from the Texas courts, we are guided by the official
commentary.” Id.
14
Chapter 4 imposes certain warranty obligations on customers who deposit checks
drawn on other banks, establishes the circumstances under which settlements for
such checks are provisional, and gives banks the right to charge back such
settlements in the event that the check is dishonored by the drawee.
Section 4.207 imposes the warranty obligations. Under Section 4.207, when
a customer deposits a check into his bank account and receives a settlement or
other consideration for the check, he makes certain warranties to the bank. TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE § 4.207(a). Those warranties include that the customer is “a
person entitled to enforce the item” and that “all signatures on the item are
authentic and authorized.” Id. § 4.207(a)(1), (2). These warranties “cannot be
disclaimed with respect to checks.” Id. § 4.207(d). If the customer breaches these
warranties, a bank that took the check “in good faith” may recover as damages “an
amount equal to the loss suffered as a result of the breach, but not more than the
amount of the item plus expenses and loss of interest incurred as a result of the
breach.” Id. § 4.207(c).
Section 4.201 establishes the provisional status of settlements. Under
Section 4.201, when a bank collects on a check deposited by its customer, the bank
acts as the customer’s agent. Id. § 4.201(a). Unless a contrary intent clearly
appears, any settlement given for the check is provisional until the settlement
15
becomes final. Id. Section 4.201 applies even if credit given for the check is
subject to immediate withdrawal or is in fact withdrawn. Id.
Section 4.214 establishes a bank’s right of chargeback. Under Section 4.214,
if a customer deposits a check into his bank account and the bank credits the
customer’s account with provisional funds, the bank may charge back the account
if the check is later dishonored by the drawee. Id. § 4.214(a).
Section 4.103 addresses the circumstances under which the provisions of
Chapter 4 may be varied by agreement. It provides:
The effect of the provisions of this chapter may be varied by
agreement, but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank’s
responsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary
care or limit the measure of damages for the lack or failure.
Id. § 4.103(a). The official comments explain that Section 4.103 “confers blanket
power to vary all provisions of the Article by agreements of the ordinary kind.” Id.
§ 4.103 cmt. 2. “The agreement may be direct, as between the owner and the
depositary bank; or indirect, as in the case in which the owner authorizes a
particular type of procedure and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to
such authorization.” Id.
C. Analysis
Cadence argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment because the evidence proves as a matter of law that Elizondo is liable for
breach of warranty under the UCC and breach of the parties’ Deposit Agreement.
16
Cadence contends that, by depositing a counterfeit check into his bank account,
Elizondo breached his warranties under Section 4.207 that he was “entitled to
enforce” the check and that “all signatures” on the check were “authentic and
authorized.” Id. § 4.207(a)(1), (2). And because Cadence took the check “in good
faith,” Cadence was entitled under Section 4.207(c) to recover as damages the
amount of the overdraft plus expenses. Id. § 4.207(c) (warrantee who takes item in
good faith may recover as damages amount equal to loss suffered from breach plus
expenses).
Cadence contends that it was also entitled to charge back the provisional
credit to Elizondo’s account and to obtain a refund in the amount of the counterfeit
check under Sections 4.201 and 4.214 of UCC and Article E, Sections 1, 2, and 14
of Deposit Agreement. Id. § 4.201(a) (establishing that Cadence received check as
Elizondo’s agent and that settlement for check was provisional); id. § 4.214(a)
(establishing bank’s right to charge back provisional settlement for dishonored
check). Cadence further contends that Elizondo’s common law defenses are
preempted by the various applicable provisions of the UCC, which are
supplemented by the Deposit Agreement but otherwise dispositive in this case and
provide a clear allocation of responsibility. Thus, Cadence concludes, the trial
court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on its claims for breach of
warranty and breach of contract.
17
Elizondo does not dispute that he breached the transfer warranties of Section
4.207. Nor does he dispute that the UCC and Deposit Agreement entitle Cadence
to charge back provisional settlement funds credited to an account for a check that
is deposited but later dishonored by the drawee. Elizondo disagrees, however, with
Cadence’s contention that his breaches caused Cadence’s alleged damages. He
likewise disagrees that Cadence was entitled to recover the overdraft resulting from
the chargeback in this case. According to Elizondo, Cadence’s alleged damages
were caused by Cadence itself.
After he breached his Section 4.207 warranties by depositing the counterfeit
check, Elizondo entered into a subsequent agreement with Cadence—an agreement
to wire transfer funds from Elizondo’s account to an international third-party
account. And, as a material term of that agreement, Cadence had a duty to transfer
the funds from a “verified collected balance”—i.e., from funds that had actually
been collected and were not merely provisional. Cadence breached this duty by
wire-transferring funds without verifying whether the funds came from a collected
balance. Had Cadence complied with the agreement, Elizondo argues, it would
have verified that Elizondo lacked sufficient funds to complete the wire transfer
and would not have completed the wire transfer with provisional funds from a
check that had not been paid. Then, once Chase dishonored the check, Cadence
would have charged back the provisional credit, resulting in no loss to Cadence.
18
Thus, Elizondo concludes, Cadence’s subsequent breach of the wire transfer
agreement entitled him to offset the chargeback by the amount of the overdraft.
Cadence responds that Elizondo’s defensive theory—i.e., Elizondo’s theory
that Cadence’s failure to transfer the funds from a “verified collected balance”
entitles Elizondo to an offset—is preempted by the UCC. Cadence further responds
that the wire transfer request form is not a valid, enforceable contract and that,
even if it is, it did not require Cadence to transfer funds from a “verified collected
balance”—at least not as Elizondo construes the term.
1. The UCC does not preempt Elizondo’s right to an offset based on
Cadence’s breach of the wire transfer agreement
We begin by considering whether the UCC preempts Elizondo’s affirmative
defense of the right to an offset. See Lone Starr Multi-Theatres, Ltd. v. Max
Interests, Ltd., 365 S.W.3d 688, 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
pet.) (right to offset is affirmative defense); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. Elizondo
argues that, although Cadence has the right to charge back his account, Cadence’s
right to recover the overdrawn funds is offset by Cadence’s breach of the wire
transfer agreement, which was the cause of the overdraft. Cadence responds that
Elizondo’s affirmative defense is preempted by the UCC because the UCC
expressly permits Cadence to charge back Elizondo’s account and thus recover the
overdraft.
19
As discussed above, the common law supplements, but does not supplant,
the UCC’s provisions. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 1.103 & cmt 2; Contractors
Source, 462 S.W.3d at 138 (common law principles complement UCC). Unless a
specific provision of the UCC provides otherwise, if a common law defense
conflicts with the UCC’s purpose or text, the UCC preempts that defense. TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE § 1.103 cmt 2.
Thus, for example, various courts have held that the UCC preempts common
law defenses to a bank’s right to charge back provisional settlement funds. These
courts reason that, because the UCC establishes when the right may be exercised
and when the right terminates, it displaces common law defenses to a bank
exercising the right, including defenses based on the bank’s alleged fraud or
negligence. See, e.g., Am. Dream Team, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 481 S.W.3d
725, 732 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied) (holding that depositor’s claim that
chargeback breached deposit agreement was preempted by UCC); Avanta Fed.
Credit Union v. Shupak, 223 P.3d 863, 871 (Mont. 2009) (holding that credit
union’s statutory charge back rights were not subject to equitable estoppel); Valley
Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 191 (Mont. 2006) (holding that
customer’s common law claims relating to bank’s processing of check, including
bank’s exercising its chargeback rights, were preempted by UCC).
20
But the UCC does not necessarily preempt common law defenses to a bank’s
right to recover an overdraft caused by a statutory chargeback of provisional
settlement funds. For example, if a customer spends provisional funds based on the
bank’s misrepresentation regarding the status of the check settlement process, and
the bank then charges back those funds, thereby causing an overdraft, the customer
may assert common law defenses to the bank’s right to recover the overdraft based
on the bank’s misrepresentation. See Shupak, 223 P.3d at 871–73 (holding that
bank was not estopped from exercising right of chargeback but was liable for
negligent misrepresentation that funds from cashier’s check were “secure” and
could be drawn upon); Hughes, 147 P.3d at 192 (holding that, although bank had
right to charge back provisional credit for counterfeit check, customer could
“obtain a judgment to compensate him for the charge-back debt” when bank
employees made misrepresentations regarding status of check); see Holcomb v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that, even though California UCC furnished bank with “absolute right” to charge
back check upon drawee’s dishonor, it did not shield bank from “damages due to
its branch manager’s alleged negligent misrepresentations regarding the check’s
status”).
Although the UCC specifies duties and responsibilities for a bank in the
actual check processing procedure, it is silent about the bank’s communications
21
with the customer about that procedure. Am. Dream Team, 481 S.W.3d at 736.
Because such communications are not addressed with specificity by the UCC,
common law principles apply under these circumstances. Id. (holding that trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on bank’s preemption defense asserted
against depositor’s fraud claim arising out of statements made by bank tellers
during check settlement process); see Hughes, 147 P.3d at 193 (“[I]n certain
circumstances, common law and equitable principles may supplement the UCC
where the bank—though not violating its UCC-defined duty of ordinary care with
respect to processing checks—breaches a duty to its depositor by misrepresenting
the status of the check settlement process.”).
As one court explains, preempting common law defenses to a bank’s right to
charge back a provisional settlement, while permitting certain common law
defenses to a bank’s right to recover a resulting overdraft, “preserves the UCC’s
carefully drawn balance between ‘certainty and predictability in commercial
transactions,’ and the comparative fault principles taken from tort law.” Shupak,
223 P.3d at 871 (quoting Call v. Ellenville Nat’l Bank, 774 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004)). The distinction, moreover, “logically addresses the actual harm
to the parties”: “Rather than estopping the bank from charging back the entire
provisional settlement, an arguably arbitrary measure of damages, the customer
22
may sue [to] recover the actual harm caused by the bank.” Shupak, 223 P.3d at
871.
Here, Elizondo has not asserted a common law defense to Cadence’s
statutory right to chargeback the provisional settlement funds. Nor does his defense
arise from the manner in which Cadence processed the check. Rather, it arises from
Cadence’s representation—memorialized as a material term of the wire transfer
agreement—that it would transfer the funds from a “verified collected balance.”
Because the UCC does not address such representations with specificity,
Elizondo’s defense is analogous to common law defenses based on a bank’s
representations regarding the status of the check settlement process. Moreover,
Elizondo’s defense logically addresses the actual harm he alleged suffered. See id.
We hold that the UCC does not preempt Elizondo’s affirmative defense of the right
to an offset based on Cadence’s breach of the subsequent wire transfer agreement.
2. Elizondo and Cadence entered into a valid and enforceable wire
transfer agreement.
We now turn to whether the parties entered into a valid, enforceable
agreement to wire transfer funds from Elizondo’s account to a third-party account
overseas. “The elements of a valid contract are (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance, (3) a
meeting of the minds, (4) each party’s consent to the terms, and (5) execution and
delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding.” Savoy v.
23
Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr. 2005-3, 557 S.W.3d 825, 835 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Elizondo informed Oh that he
needed to wire transfer funds from his Cadence account to a third-party account in
Japan and provided Oh with the information necessary to complete the transfer.
Oh responded by preparing a wire transfer request form and emailing it to
Elizondo for signature. The top half of the form consisted of fields filled in with
the information that Elizondo had provided Oh. The top half also included a box
for Elizondo’s signature and a declaration that Elizondo understood that Cadence
makes no guarantees concerning the delivery of international wires; that he would
be responsible for tracer fees if a problem arose or if the funds were returned; and
that the transfer could take up to 10 business days. The bottom half of the form
included Cadence’s fee for the wire transfer ($55) and blank fields to be filled in
by Cadence employees after Elizondo had signed and submitted the form. These
blanks included a field for the amount of the “collected balance” from which the
wire transfer would be made and a field for the name of the “employee who
verified [the] collected balance.” The bottom half of the form stated that these two
blank fields had to be filled in by a Cadence employee. The bottom half also
included a signature box for the Cadence officer who approved the wire transfer
and instructed the officer as follows:
24
Before signing off, be sure you “know your customer” and have
verified the collected balance and documented any exception
approvals.
Elizondo reviewed the form, signed it, and emailed it back to Oh. Oh then
filled out and signed the two “collected balance” fields, writing that the “collected
balance” was $497,643.89. Another Cadence employee, S. Baker, filled out several
other fields and wrote in the margins of the form that $497,643.89 was Elizondo’s
“available balance.” And Assistant Branch Manager Y. Villatoro signed the form
as the approving officer. After these Cadence employees filled out the remainder of
the form, Cadence wire transferred funds from Elizondo’s account to the thirdparty account in Japan.
This evidence shows that the parties entered into a valid and enforceable
agreement. By signing the form and returning it to Cadence, Elizondo made an
offer—an offer to pay Cadence $55 to wire transfer “verified collected” funds from
his IOLTA account to a third-party account in Japan. By accepting, completing,
and signing the form, Cadence accepted Elizondo’s offer. The parties’ course of
conduct likewise reflects a meeting of the minds, each party’s consent to the terms,
and execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and
binding. We hold that the parties entered into a valid, enforceable agreement to
wire transfer funds from Elizondo’s account to a third-party account in Japan and
that the terms of that agreement are set forth in the wire transfer request form.
25
3. The agreement required Cadence to transfer funds from a
“verified collected balance.”
Having determined that the parties entered into a valid, enforceable wire
transfer agreement, we now consider whether that agreement required Cadence to
transfer the funds from a “verified collected balance.” Cadence argues that it was
not required, as a material term of the agreement, to transfer the funds from a
collected balance because the fields on the bottom half of the form, including the
fields instructing Cadence to verify the collected balance, were not filled in when
Elizondo signed and submitted the form. We disagree.
Not all the fields on the bottom half of the form were incomplete when
Elizondo signed and submitted the form. Importantly, the field for Cadence’s fee—
which was on the same row as the collected balance fields—was completed and
stated that the fee for the wire transfer would be $55. Because Cadence’s fee was a
material term of the agreement, the field’s placement in the bottom half of the form
next to the collected balance fields indicates that the collected balanced fields
constitute material terms as well. Moreover, the form did not state that the bottom
half was for Cadence’s use only or otherwise indicate that the bottom half did not
constitute part of the agreement. And form contracts are routinely executed in this
manner—with one party signing and submitting a document with various fields left
incomplete and to be filled by the other party. When Elizondo submitted the form,
he knew the bottom would be completed by Cadence, as the form expressly states
26
that the bottom half fields “must be filled in.” We therefore reject Cadence’s
argument that the collected balance fields do not form part of the agreement by
virtue of their location on the bottom half of the form and the time at which they
were completed.
Cadence further argues that, even if the agreement required Cadence to
transfer the funds from a “collected balance,” that term does not bear the meaning
that Elizondo ascribes to it. Thus, we must construe the term “collected balance.”
We construe contract terms according to their plain, common, or generally
accepted meanings unless the contract shows that the parties used words in a
technical or different sense. Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors
Inc., 473 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2015); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164
S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005). Here, both sides agree that the term “collected
balance” is an industry term. To determine the meaning of an industry term, a court
may refer to extrinsic evidence, such as industry dictionaries, statutory definitions,
or expert testimony. Mescalero Energy, Inc. v. Underwriters Indem. Gen. Agency,
Inc., 56 S.W.3d 313, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). In
this case, Elizondo and Cadence offer the deposition testimony of their respective
witnesses to support their proposed alternative constructions of “collected
balance.”
27
Specifically, Elizondo offers the testimony of his expert witness, Dr.
Kenneth Lehrer, a registered investor advisor who has served as chairman of four
banks. In his deposition, Lehrer testified that a “collected balance” is an industry
term that means a “balance minus deposited checks in the process of collection,
i.e., minus checks that have not been actually paid by the paying bank.” Lehrer
explained that the definition of collected balance is “banking 101: Either you got
the money or you don’t.”
Cadence offers the testimony of its corporate representative and branch
administration manager, J. Scott. In her deposition, Scott testified that Cadence has
its own, internal definition of “collected balance.” And under that internal
definition, Scott testified, “collected balance” means “the end-of-day ledger
balance less any debits plus any credits from the previous day,” not including
credits subject to “holds.” Thus, Scott explained, under Cadence’s internal
definition, a “collected balance” does not “necessarily” consist of funds that have
“actually” been “received” and can include provisional credit for uncollected
checks.
Cadence also offered the testimony of its expert witness, Richard McElroy,
Jr. In his deposition, McElroy testified that every bank has its “own definition of
collected balance” based on the bank’s assumption of when funds for deposited
items are collected. McElroy testified that a bank cannot determine on a case-by-
28
case basis when payment has been received for each deposited item and that a bank
therefore determines a customer’s collected balance based on the bank’s
assumption of when payment for each deposited item is most likely to be received.
The bank’s assumption, in turn, is based on the bank’s own “internal calculations
and formulas” and has “has no connection with reality”—i.e., no connection with
when the funds are actually received.
Although neither party has offered any other extrinsic evidence, such as an
industry dictionary or statutory definition, to support their proposed constructions
of “collected balance,” through our own research, we have found authority
supporting both constructions.3
3 Compare In re Cannon, 237 F.3d 716, 720 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“The collected balance refers to the balance of collected debits and credits; the
ledger balance is the balance of all debits and credits, both collected and
uncollected. Thus, when a bank grants a provisional credit it shows up on the
ledger balance, but not the collected balance.”), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 707.1–.11,
Appendix C to Part 707—Official Staff Interpretations, Bk. Compl. Gd. 6262671
(“Collected balance means the record of balance in a member’s account reflecting
collected funds, that is, cash or checks deposited in the credit union which have
been presented for payment and for which payment has actually been received.”),
with Frost Nat’l Bank v. Parker, No. 95-2150, 1999 WL 33438078, at *2 (C.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 1999), aff’d sub nom. Frost Nat. Bank v. Midwest Autohaus, Inc., 241
F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The collected balance is the result of the computer’s
estimate of how long it will take to collect [deposited] items through the banking
system, usually between one and five days.”); see also FRB Adopts Truth in
Savings Regulations, Fed. Bank. L. Rep. P 89134, 1992 WL 12914346 (Federal
Reserve Board of Governors observing that “the term ‘collected balance’ does not
have a uniform meaning within the financial services industry”).
29
However, we are convinced that, under these circumstances, the construction
proposed by Elizondo reflects the true intent of the parties as expressed in the
instrument. Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 224 S.W.3d
369, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“In construing a written
contract, our primary concern is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as
expressed in the instrument.”). That is largely because Elizondo’s proposed
construction is the only one that harmonizes and gives effect to the provisions of
both the wire transfer agreement and the underlying Deposit Agreement. See id.
(“We examine the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all of
its provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless.”).
The Deposit Agreement does not define “collected balance.” It does,
however, define “available balance” and “posted balance”:
Available Balance—The balance of funds in [the customer’s] account
that is available for immediate withdrawal. Unlike the Posted Balance,
the Available Balance reflects any holds placed on [the] account . . . .
Posted Balance—The balance of funds in [the customer’s] account
based solely on items that have been posted as credits or debits to
[the] account. Unlike the Available Balance, the Posted Balance does
not reflect any holds placed on [the] account.
This indicates that the term “collected balance” must mean something
different than these two defined terms. But as Elizondo points out repeatedly in his
brief, Cadence uses “collected balance” and “available balance” interchangeably.
30
Cadence has not attempted to rebut this point. In fact, Cadence appears to agree. In
its reply brief, Cadence states (with emphasis added by us):
Collected balance in the computer system represents the end-of-day
ledger balance, minus any debits, and plus any credits from the
previous day. This collected balance can include a provisional credit
for a check when holds have been removed regardless whether the
check has been finally paid. Even the version of the form that
Elizondo relies on specifically states: “Ava. Bal: 497,643.80.”
Thus, were we to adopt Cadence’s proposed construction, “collected
balance” and “available balance” would mean the same thing: the customer’s
ledger balance, less any debits, plus any credit not subject to holds. But this would
run afoul of various contextual canons, including the presumption of consistent
usage, according to which a material variation in terms suggests a variation in
meaning;4
and the rule against surplusage, according to which a term should not be
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another term or to have no
consequence.5
Moreover, Cadence never disclosed its internal definition of “collected
balance” to Elizondo. Indeed, in its brief, Cadence emphasizes that it construes
“collected balance” according to an “internal definition” that is not disclosed to its
4 See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, no pet.); Horseshoe Bay Resort, Ltd. v. CRVI CDP Portfolio, LLC, 415
S.W.3d 370, 384 & n.7 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.).
5 See Bishop v. Owens, No. 01-13-00678-CV, 2014 WL 4260520, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 28, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
31
customers. But Cadence’s failure to disclose its internal definition to Elizondo only
underscores that Elizondo had no reason to construe the term according to that
definition.
When a bank uses a form contract to facilitate a transaction with a customer,
and the contract uses a term with various acceptable meanings within the industry,
the bank cannot construe that term according to an internal, undisclosed definition
that has the same meaning as another term defined in a separate document
governing the relationship between the parties. Here, Cadence presented no
evidence that its internal definition of “collected balance” was made available to
Elizondo or that Elizondo would otherwise have reason to construe the term
according to this definition. To the contrary, Cadence’s expert affirmatively
testified that Cadence had no duty and no reason to do so.
We reject Cadence’s contention that the term should be construed according
to Cadence’s internal, undisclosed definition and instead construe the term
according to the definition proposed by Elizondo. Thus, the term “collected
balance,” as used in the wire transfer request form, means the balance of funds that
have actually been collected and therefore excludes funds for unpaid checks and
other items in the process of collection.
32
4. Cadence caused the overdraft by breaching the agreement.
Elizondo and Cadence entered into a valid, enforceable agreement to wire
transfer funds from Elizondo’s IOLTA account to a third-party account overseas.
The agreement required Cadence to transfer the funds from a verified collected
balance—i.e., from a balance consisting of funds from checks for which payment
had actually been received from the paying banks. Cadence failed to do so—it
made the transfer using the provisional settlement funds credited to Elizondo’s
account for the counterfeit check before payment for the check had actually been
received from the paying bank. Thus, Cadence breached the parties’ agreement.
Had Cadence not breached the agreement, the chargeback made by Cadence
to Elizondo’s account would not have resulted in an overdraft. Instead, Cadence
would have verified that Elizondo lacked sufficient funds to complete the wire
transfer and would not have completed the wire transfer with provisional
settlement funds from the unpaid check. Then, once Chase dishonored the check,
Cadence would have charged-back the provisional credit, resulting in no loss to
Cadence.
Cadence nevertheless contends that Elizondo is not entitled to an offset.
Cadence argues that it is irrelevant whether the funds were transferred from a
“collected balance” because a drawee bank may dishonor a check for up to three
years. So even if Chase had initially paid the check—and Cadence had thus
33
transferred funds from a collected balance—Chase would have eventually
discovered that the check was counterfeit and revoked the payment, and Cadence
would have then been entitled to chargeback Elizondo’s account and recover the
overdraft. We disagree.
First, case law across various jurisdictions, including Texas, consistently
recognizes that a customer may assert a bank’s subsequent misrepresentations
regarding the status of the check settlement process as a defense to a bank’s right
to recover an overdraft caused by a chargeback. See, e.g., Am. Dream Team, 481
S.W.3d at 736; Shupak, 223 P.3d at 873; Holcomb, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 148.
Second, whether the funds were transferred from a “collected balance” is
relevant. Even though a drawee bank may dishonor a check for up to three years, a
customer of the collecting bank might reasonably insist that the check be paid
before transferring funds from the check because the drawee’s initial payment
would at least indicate that the check—and the funds from it—were good. Thus,
Elizondo could reasonably insist that funds be transferred from a collected
balance—despite Chase’s right to revoke the settlement for up to three years—
because Chase’s initial payment of the check would indicate (though not
conclusively prove) that the check was good.
34
We hold that Cadence’s breach of the wire transfer agreement entitled
Elizondo to offset Cadence’s chargeback by the amount of the overdrawn funds as
a matter of law.
* * *
In sum, Elizondo breached the UCC and the parties’ Deposit Agreement by
depositing the counterfeit check into his IOLTA bank account. Elizondo and
Cadence then entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to wire transfer funds
from Elizondo’s account. The agreement required Cadence to wire transfer the
funds from a “verified collected balance.” Cadence breached the agreement by
making the transfer using the provisional settlement funds credited to Elizondo’s
account for the unpaid, counterfeit check. Had Cadence not breached the
agreement, the chargeback made by Cadence to Elizondo’s account would not
have resulted in an overdraft. Thus, although Cadence had the right under the UCC
and the Deposit Agreement to charge back the provisional settlement funds,
Elizondo was entitled to offset the chargeback by the amount of the overdrawn
funds, thereby negating Cadence’s alleged damages. We hold that the trial court
did not err in granting Elizondo’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we
overrule Cadence’s two issues.
35
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.
Justice Keyes, dissenting.
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