FDCPA and Suing the wrong person with the same last name: Smith v. Moss Law Firm, P.C. (USDC SD Tex. 2019)

INDIVIDUAL WHO IS DUNNED OR SUED BUT DOES NOT OWE THE DEBT CAN HAVE STANDING TO BRING  UNFAIR COLLECTION CLAIM UNDER FAIR DEBT COLLECTION STATUTES 

Motion to dismiss in FDCPA action brought by non-debtor against prominent Texas debt collection attorney Michael Moss's law firm denied. Defendant collection law firm argued that plaintiff did not have standing to sue under FDCPA and its Texas state law counterpart: the Texas Debt Collection Act. A federal district court judge in Dallas found otherwise.

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.
MOSS LAW FIRM, P.C., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-2449-D.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

January 15, 2019.

Christopher Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Ramona Veronica Ladwig, Hyde & Swigart, Anthony Patrick Chester, Hyde & Swigart & Seyed Abbas Kazerounian, Kazerouni Law Group APC.

Moss Law Firm PC, Defendant, represented by Rebecca Anne Moss, Moss Law Firm PC & Michael Allen Moss, Moss Law Firm PC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, Senior District Judge.  

In this action asserting claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), and the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 392.001-.404 (West 2006) ("TDCPA"), defendant moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The principal question presented is whether plaintiff lacks statutory standing^[1] to maintain this action because defendant's collection activities were not "directed" at him. Concluding that plaintiff has plausibly pleaded authorization to sue under the FDCPA and the TDCPA, the court denies the motion to dismiss.

I

This action by plaintiff Christopher Smith ("Smith") relates to a suit filed in Texas justice court in October 2017. At that time, defendant Moss Law Firm, P.C. ("Moss") filed suit on behalf of Barclays Bank Delaware ("Barclays") to collect a delinquent debt.^[2] Smith alleges, inter alia, that the debt in dispute does not belong to him, that the lawsuit was wrongfully initiated against him, and that he informed Moss of the error. Smith also asserts that, despite the information he provided Moss (including his social security number and date of birth), Moss nevertheless proceeded with the lawsuit. Smith avers that he retained an attorney "to defend the lawsuit to avoid liability for a judgment he could not afford being wrongfully entered in his name and causing possible damage of his credit." Compl. ¶ 24. Smith was nonsuited (the Texas term for voluntarily dismissed) from the justice-court suit approximately one month after it was filed. Smith then brought this action against Moss, alleging that Moss's conduct in connection with the justice-court lawsuit violated the FDCPA and the TDCPA and that these violations caused Smith to suffer "actual damages in the form of loss of money, time, and emotional distress." Compl. ¶ 35.

Moss moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Smith lacks statutory standing because the justice-court lawsuit was not directed at Smith, but was instead directed at his son, Christopher O. Smith II. Smith opposes the motion.

II

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by "accept[ing] `all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive Moss's motion to dismiss, Smith must allege enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]"). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require `detailed factual allegations,'" it demands more than "labels and conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that "whether or not a particular cause of action authorizes an injured plaintiff to sue is a merits question . . . not a jurisdictional question." Camsoft Data Sys., Inc. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2014)(quoting Blanchard 1986, Ltd. v. Park Plantation, LLC, 553 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2008)). Accordingly, if statutory standing is lacking, the claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). See id.; Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) ("Unlike a dismissal for lack of constitutional standing, which should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), a dismissal for lack of prudential or statutory standing is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6)."). The inquiry that is important in determining whether Smith has statutory standing is, in effect, "whether [Smith] has a cause of action under the statute[s]." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014).

III

A

The court first considers whether Smith was required to submit evidence to show that he has statutory standing. Moss contends that Smith has the burden to establish that he has statutory standing. The court agrees that Smith must allege an adequate basis to proceed with his case and must ultimately adduce evidence that he is entitled to relief. Moss also appears to contend, however, that it has made a factual attack on Smith's standing, thus requiring Smith to prove at this stage of the case—with evidence—that he has statutory standing to bring his claims.^[3] See D. Reply 3 n.2 ("[A] party may submit evidence outside the pleadings when making a factual attack on a party's prudential or statutory standing."); id. at 2 ("Plaintiff contends, without support other than his own belief, that the suit was filed against him[.]"). To the extent this is Moss's contention, the court disagrees that Moss has made (or is able to make) a factual attack that requires Smith to prove the existence of statutory standing by a preponderance of the evidence and to submit facts through some evidentiary method to sustain his burden of proof. See Gonzalez v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2017 WL 9324466, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017) (explaining that it would be improper to consider matters outside the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacking statutory standing); but see Myles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 2017 WL 238436, at *4, 8 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 19, 2017) (considering matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacking statutory standing).

Indeed, to accept Moss's contention would be to confuse a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. When moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant can make a facial or factual challenge. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). An attack is "factual" rather than "facial" if the defendant "submits affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials." Id. For a plaintiff to defeat a factual attack, he must submit facts through some evidentiary method to prove the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. In its reply, Moss contends that Smith "fails to meet his burden of proving statutory standing," D. Reply 3, suggesting that Moss is making a factual attack and that Smith is required to adduce evidence to meet his burden. But the court declines to impose the Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge framework where Moss seeks dismissal for lack of statutory standing, which is properly evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Camsoft Data Sys., 756 F.3d at 332. And under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must limit its inquiry "to the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Gonzalez, 2017 WL 9324466, at *4. Thus Smith is not required to submit—nor would the court have considered—additional evidence in support of his statutory standing.

That said, "[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his] claim." Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004)(citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). In this case, Moss has attached Barclay's justice-court petition to its motion to dismiss. "In so attaching, [Moss] merely assists [Smith] in establishing the basis of the suit, and the court in making the elementary determination of whether a claim has been stated." Collins, 224 F.3d at 499. The justice-court case is referred to in Smith's complaint and is central to Smith's claims, and the original petition aids the court in making a determination of whether Smith has a cause of action under the FDCPA or the TDCPA. The court's Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry thus includes the complaint in this case and the justice-court petition.

B

The court next considers whether Smith lacks statutory standing under the FDCPA or the TDCPA. Moss challenges Smith's statutory standing based on its contention that its collection activities were not directed at Smith.

1

Although a primary purpose of the FDCPA is "to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses," the FDCPA does not limit recovery to debtors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). Indeed, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, which defines civil liability for FDCPA violations, provides that "any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of [the FDCPA] with respect to any person is liable to such person[.]" Id. § 1692k(a). District courts in this circuit and others have recognized that "under certain circumstances, third-party, non-debtors have standing to bring claims under the FDCPA." See Prophet v. Myers, 2009 WL 1437799, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2009) (compiling cases).

Similarly, the TDCPA is intended to protect consumers, but does not limit recovery to consumers. Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403 creates a private right of action for TDCPA violations and provides: "A person may sue for: actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter." Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(2). According to the Fifth Circuit, "persons who have sustained actual damages from a [TDCPA] violation have standing to sue." McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 473 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(2)).

2

Moss does not assert that non-debtor plaintiffs can never state a claim under the FDCPA and the TDCPA. But it contends that courts allow non-debtor actions "only when conduct is abusive, directed at the non-debtor, and results in actual damages." D. Mot. 6. Moss maintains that it "did not direct any debt collection efforts at [Smith]," and it points to the account statement attached to the justice-court petition, which bears the name "Christopher O[.] Smith II," not "Christopher O. Smith." Id. at 6-7. Smith responds that Moss's collection activities were directed against him because, inter alia, the justice-court petition alleged that Smith owed the debt, and Moss proceeded with the lawsuit despite being told that Smith was the wrong party. Without suggesting a view on how the court would decide a motion for summary judgment or how a jury would evaluate the merits of Smith's claims, the court concludes that Smith's case should not be dismissed for lack of statutory standing, as Moss contends.

At this stage of the case, the court accepts Smith's well-pleaded facts as true and evaluates "whether [Smith] has a cause of action under the statute[s]." Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 572 U.S. at 128. To state a claim under the FDCPA, Smith must plausibly plead that a debt collector has failed to comply with a provision of the FDCPA with respect to him. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). Smith alleges that Moss sought to collect a debt that Smith did not owe to Barclays; that Moss initiated a lawsuit against Smith to collect this alleged debt; that Smith informed Moss of the error; and that Moss nevertheless continued to pursue the lawsuit against Smith. Moss is correct that the account statement attached to the justice-court petition bears the name "Christopher O[.] Smith II." But that fact does not undermine Smith's allegations of collection activity directed at him—especially considering that the caption and party description within the justice-court petition bear the name "CHRISTOPHER O SMITH," without the "II" addition. Reading Smith's complaint and the justice-court petition under the proper standard, Smith has adequately pleaded that Moss's actions were directed toward him.

Turning to the TDCPA, the Fifth Circuit has rejected a requirement that debt collection efforts be "directed" or "targeted" at a particular individual for the individual to have standing to sue under the TDCPA. See McCaig, 788 F.3d at 474. Moss cites several district court cases, such as Prophet, 2009 WL 1437799, and Ledezma v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6674285 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2014), that impose a targeting requirement, but these cases predate McCaig and, more important, McCaig expressly rejects the targeting rule applied in Prophet. See McCaig, 788 F.3d at 474 & n.3. The Fifth Circuit explained that, "[i]n rejecting this rule, it is sufficient to observe that Section 392.403(a)(2) contains no targeting requirement and that the district courts that have adopted the rule did not base their standing analyses on the text of Section 392.403(a)(2)." Id. at 474. Thus, as instructed by the Fifth Circuit, this court's duty is to apply existing state law, which suggests that the rule is that "persons who have sustained actual damages from a [TDCPA] violation have standing to sue." Id. at 473 (citing Tex. Fin. Ann. Code § 392.403(a)(2)). Smith alleges that Moss violated Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.304(a)(19), and that, as a result of Moss's actions, he has "suffered actual damages in the form of loss of money, time, and emotional distress." Compl. ¶ 35. These allegations are sufficient to plausibly plead Smith's authorization to sue pursuant to the TDCPA.

Accordingly, Smith has alleged a plausible basis to proceed under the FDCPA and the TDCPA; his claims do not fail at the motion to dismiss stage for want of collection activities directed at him.

* * *

For the reasons explained, the court denies Moss's motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.

[1] Although "statutory standing" is an imperfect label that can be misused because it is not truly a "standing" doctrine, the term is used by the parties throughout their briefing, and the court is satisfied that, in this case, it is being used to refer to the correct inquiry: whether the plaintiff has pleaded a plausible cause of action under the statutes. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 (2014).

[2] The lawsuit was captioned Barclays Bank Delaware v. Christopher O Smith, Case No. JX1700978H, in the Justice Court, Precinct 1, Place 1, of Dallas County, Texas.

[3] The court recognizes that, in Superior MRI Services, Inc. v. Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc., 778 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2015), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court decision in which a defendant "brought a factual attack on [plaintiff's] prudential standing." The court also recognizes that the terms "prudential standing" and "statutory standing" are sometimes used interchangeably, which may have prompted Moss to cite Superior MRI Services and posit that "[t]he Fifth Circuit has made it clear . . . that a party may submit evidence outside the pleadings when making a factual attack on a party's prudential or statutory standing." D. Reply 3 n.2. But Superior MRI Services did not involve statutory standing. In fact, the Fifth Circuit panel explicitly discussed the fact that the "type of prudential standing requirement" at issue in that case (third-party standing) was different from the type that was before the Supreme Court in Lexmark (statutory standing). See Superior MRI Servs., 778 F.3d at 506. Thus the court does not agree that Superior MRI Services should be applied to cases involving statutory standing.

Texas counterpart to FDCPA is broader and includes foreclosure activity within debt collection subject to the TDCA

Guerroro v. Bank of America NA, Civil Action H-17-239, USDC Tex. SD (July 6, 2017)

The TDCPA is a state law that allows a consumer to sue for "threats, coercion, harassment, abuse, unconscionable collection methods, or misrepresentations made in connection with the collection of a debt." Dominguez v. Ben. Fin. I, Inc., No. B:14-67, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184166, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015) (Morgan, J.). Under the Act, a "debt collector" is a "person who directly or indirectly engages in debt collection and includes a person who sells or offers to sell forms represented to be a collection system, device, or scheme intended to be used to collect consumer debts." Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6). Further, a "debt collection" is an "action, conduct, or practice, in collecting, or in soliciting for collection, consumer debts that are due or alleged to be due a creditor." Id. § 392.001(5).
 
BANA argues that BANA is not a collector subject to the Act because the Assignment established BANA as a mortgagee, and BANA was collecting on a debt that it was rightfully due. Dkt. 6 at 15-16.

The court notes that BANA may be considered a "debt collector" and that an "act of foreclosure is `debt collection' for purposes of the TDCPA." See Sias v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. EP-12-cv-417-PRM, 2013 WL 8476169, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2013) (holding that Wells Fargo is a "debt collector" for the purposes of the TDCPA); see also Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing the definition of a "debt collector" under the TDCPA from the more restrictive definition under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)).

Although the Texas Supreme Court has not conclusively addressed the issue, federal courts in Texas have ruled that a foreclosure may be considered debt collection activity. Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734-35 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (holding that a foreclosure is considered "debt collection" under the TDCPA); Gatling v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. H-11-2879, 2012 WL 3756581, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2012) (Rosenthal, J.) (finding CitiMortgage to be a "debt collector" under the TDCPA's broader definition); Akintunji v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., No. H-11-389, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65050, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2011) (Rosenthal, J.) ("Unlike the FDCPA, the TDCPA encompasses foreclosure activities by mortgage holders."). The definition of a "debt collector" may include anyone who engages in debt collection, whether directly or indirectly, and this also encompasses creditors collecting their own debts. Auriti v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-334, 2013 WL 2417832, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2013) (Costa, J.) ("TDC[P]A's general definition of `debt collector' is more expansive . . . and may include mortgage holders and servicers.").

BANA is attempting to collect on the mortgage loan and to foreclose on Guerrero's Property. Therefore, the TDCPA applies to BANA for its foreclosure activity.

MICHAEL GUERRERO, Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA N.A., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. ("MERS"), Defendants.

Civil Action H-17-239.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

July 6, 2017.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GRAY H. MILLER, District Judge.
  

Pending before the court is defendant Bank of America, N.A.'s ("BANA") motion to dismiss a suit filed by plaintiff Michael Guerrero (Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A).^[1] Dkt 6. The court granted Guerrero's motion for extension of time to respond to BANA's motion to dismiss. Dkt. 11. As of the date of this order, Guerrero has not responded to BANA's motion. Having considered the motion, related filings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that BANA's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) should be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a foreclosure case. Guerrero filed this lawsuit to preclude BANA and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") from foreclosing on his property located at 8702 Sailing Drive, Humble, Texas 77346 (the "Property"). Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 7. Guerrero claims that BANA failed to review a pending loan modification application and wrongfully sent Guerrero a notice of foreclosure. Id. at 7-15.

In April 2005, Guerrero purchased the Property and obtained a mortgage loan from Country Wide Mortgage in the amount of $128,023.00, secured by a Deed of Trust. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 7-8. In September 2008, Country Wide Mortgage assigned Guerrero's loan to BANA through MERS, and recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust. Id. In 2010, Guerrero suffered a financial hardship, missed mortgage payments, and contacted BANA to resolve his delinquent mortgage loan. Id. Guerrero alleged that he applied to BANA for a loan modification several times and was denied without explanation. Id. at 8-9. At some unspecified time, Guerrero made a lump sum payment of "over $8,000 to reinstate the loan," while continuing to seek a loan modification. Id. at 9.

In mid-2014, Guerrero contacted BANA to resolve his delinquent loan and to re-apply for another loan modification. Id. Between mid-2014 and November 2016, Guerrero sent at least three loan modification applications to BANA. Id. On November 21, 2016, Guerrero received a letter from BANA stating that his application was under review. Id.at 36. Following this correspondence, on November 30, 2016, BANA sent Guerrero a notice of foreclosure. Id. at 39. The foreclosure was set for January 3, 2017. Id.Guerrero argues that BANA wrongfully sent him a notice of foreclosure, because he never received a notice of default or had an opportunity to cure the default. Id. at 10.

On January 2, 2017, Guerrero filed suit against BANA and MERS in the 11th Judicial District Court for Harris County, Texas. Dkt. 1 at 1. Upon removal to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and federal question, BANA filed this motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Dkt. 6. On February 22, 2017, Guerrero filed a motion for extension of time to respond to BANA's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 11) and the motion was granted. Dkt. 13. Guerrero's deadline to respond was March 8, 2017. Id. As of the date of this order, Guerrero has not responded to BANA's motion to dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that the pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As part of the Twombly-Iqbal analysis, the court proceeds in two steps. First, the court separates legal conclusions from well-pled facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the court reviews the well-pled factual allegations, assumes they are true, and then determines whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679.

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the court will consider Guerrero's complaint and his attached exhibits. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A.

III. ANALYSIS

Guerrero brings the following claims against BANA: common law fraud, breach of contract, violations of Regulation X of the Code of Federal Regulations and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), and violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act. 12. C.F.R. § 1024; Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002; Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001; Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A. BANA moves to dismiss all of Guerrero's claims for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Dkt 6. Additionally, BANA argues Guerrero has not stated any claims or specific allegations against MERS and moves to dismiss MERS as a defendant. Id. The court will address each of these claims in turn.

A. Common Law Fraud

Guerrero argues that BANA's actions constitute common law fraud and misrepresentation of material facts which he "relied upon to [his] detriment." Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A, at 11-12. Guerrero alleges that BANA agreed on "numerous occasions during 2010-2016" to consider Guerrero for a loan modification. Id. Guerrero claims that after BANA failed to respond to his requests, BANA proceeded to post his property for foreclosure. Id. BANA, however, argues that Guerrero's fraud claim should be dismissed because he makes general allegations and fails to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Dkt. 6 at 11. Furthermore, BANA argues the claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 10.

Under Texas law, to recover for a claim of common law fraud, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that a material representation was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that the speaker knew it was false when made or that the speaker made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth; (4) that the speaker made it with the intention that it be acted upon by the other party; (5) that the party acted in reliance upon it; and (6) the party was injured as a result of the reliance. T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. 1992). State law claims must be pled with particularity and are "subject to the heightened pleading requirements of FRCP Rule 9(b)." Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC,600 F.3d 542, 550-51 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must specify the fraudulent statements, "identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent." Id. at 551.

Texas courts have also recognized the economic loss doctrine and the general rule that precludes recovery under tort law when the plaintiff's economic loss is based on contract law alone. Arlington Home, Inc. v. Peak Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 361 S.W.3d 773, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). The nature of the injury determines which duty has been breached. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1991). "When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone." Id.

Guerrero makes general allegations that BANA falsely represented material facts. Specifically, the complaint does not allege whether BANA knew the statements made were false or were made without knowledge of the truth. The court finds that Guerrero's bare-bone allegations do not meet the specificity required under Rule 9(b). See Sullivan, 600 F.3d at 551 ("identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent"). Additionally, Texas courts preclude recovery in tort when the subject matter is contractual and the nature of the injury arises from a contractual duty. Arlington, 360 S.W.3d at 779. Guerrero's claim is contractual in nature and does not arise from a tort duty. The court finds that Guerrero's complaint does not meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and his claim is also barred by the economic loss doctrine. Therefore, BANA's motion to dismiss Guerrero's common law fraud claim is GRANTED.

B. Breach of Contract

Guerrero alleges that BANA's actions constitute a material breach of the Deed of Trust because Guerrero made "numerous payments" on his mortgage and BANA failed to provide Guerrero with a notice of default and an opportunity to cure as required by the Texas Property Code. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 12-13. Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code "governs the sale of real property under deeds of trust or other contract liens." Lyons v. America's Wholesale Lender, No. 3:13-cv-2608-B, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2014). Section 51.002(d) states that "[n]otwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the mortgage servicer . . . shall serve a debtor in default . . . with written notice by certified mail stating that the debtor is in default . . . and giving the debtor at least 20 days to cure the default before notice of the sale can be given." Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d).

BANA argues that Guerrero is not entitled to recover for a breach of contract claim because he did not fulfill his contractual obligations by remaining current on his monthly payments. Dkt. 6 at 12-13. Further, BANA argues that it provided Guerrero timely notice of default in accordance with section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d); Dkt. 6 at 13. For a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pled facts contained in Guerrero's complaint as true, despite arguments or exhibits disputing those facts offered in BANA's motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

To state a claim for breach of contract under Texas law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damages resulting from the breach. Lewis v. Bank of America, N.A., 343 F.3d 540, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2003). However, Texas law also recognizes that a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach. Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1990). In his complaint, Guerrero concedes he was delinquent on his loan and stopped making payments in 2014. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 9 (alleging that "[p]laintiff once again contacted Defendant Bank of America to discuss ways to resolve the delinquency of his mortgage loan").

The court agrees with BANA that Guerrero did not fulfill his contractual obligations because Guerrero conceded that he was trying to resolve his delinquency. Id. Because Guerrero defaulted on his loan, the court finds that he cannot bring a breach of contract claim against BANA. See Dobbins, 785 S.W.2d at 378. Accordingly, BANA's motion to dismiss Guerrero's breach of contract claim is GRANTED.

C. Violation of RESPA and Regulation X of the C.F.R.

Guerrero alleges he submitted a complete loss mitigation application to BANA in November 2016 that is still pending. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 14. According to Guerrero, BANA cannot file a notice of foreclosure while the application remains pending because that action would violate Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024(f)(2)(i). Id. Section 1024 of the Code of Federal Regulations implements the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ("RESPA"), and section 1024.41 provides instructions on loss mitigation procedures. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. RESPA provides a mortgagor protection by imposing certain obligations on loan servicing companies. Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 (S.D. Tex. 2007). RESPA requires a servicer, upon receiving a complete loss mitigation application, to notify the borrower that the borrower is not eligible for a loss mitigation option before proceeding to foreclosure. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(2)(i).

BANA argues that the claim should be dismissed because section 1024.41 only applies in cases where a complete mitigation application is received more than thirty-seven days before a foreclosure sale. Dkt. 6 at 14-15; see 12. C.F.R § 1024.41. BANA asserts that Guerrero's application, however, was incomplete. Dkt. 6 at 14-15. BANA states that on November 25, 2016, it sent Guerrero a letter stating that his application was incomplete and that Guerrero needed to submit additional information. Id. BANA argues that because Guerrero did not submit a complete application, he is not entitled to damages under section 2605(f) of RESPA. Id. at 10.

In addition to Guerrero's incomplete application, BANA argues that Guerrero's claim under section 1024.41 is premature since no foreclosure sale has occurred. Id. at 9. In this case, Guerrero's complaint does not state whether foreclosure actually occurred. However, the temporary restraining order granted by the state court suggests that no foreclosure sale occurred at the time this suit was filed. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 43; see Mahmood v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:11-cv-3054-M-BK, 2012 WL 527902, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's claim under the Texas Property Code should be dismissed because no foreclosure had occurred); see, e.g., Wenegieme v. Bayview Loan Servicing, No. 14 Civ. 9137(RWS), 2015 WL 2151822, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (finding plaintiffs' claim was not ripe because foreclosure proceedings were still pending and plaintiffs did not lose their home). Without ruling on the ripeness claim, the court still finds that Guerrero has not pled enough facts for a claim under section 1024.41.

Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the "plaintiff's complaint is to be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the allegations contained therein are to be taken as true." Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's complaint requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932 (1986)).

The court finds that Guerrero did not include any factual basis for his claim other than a conclusory statement that BANA violated Regulation X of the C.F.R. See 12 C.F.R. 1024.41. Specifically, Guerrero merely alleges that he sent a complete application that remains pending and that this violates the statute, but this alone is not enough to satisfy the plaintiff's pleading standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In another factually-similar case, where a homeowner contested a bank's ability to foreclose while a loan modification application was pending, the plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss because he had pled relevant dates on which he submitted a complete application. Obazee v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 3:15-cv-1082-D, 2015 WL 4602971, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2015). The Obazee plaintiff argued that he did not receive any notice or communication from the bank in regards to his loan modification, but the bank posted his home for foreclosure anyway. Id. The Obazee court found that the allegations, taken as true, were sufficiently pled and survived a motion to dismiss. Id.; see Bryant v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:15-cv-3818-B, 2016 WL 3523775, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (surviving a motion to dismiss because plaintiff alleged that he submitted a completed loan application with relevant dates and the bank never responded).
  

The facts in Bray v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC are also distinguishable from the instant case. In a motion for summary judgment, the defendant, a mortgage servicing company, argued that in the absence of a complete application, it did not have a duty to timely respond to the plaintiff's request for a loan modification. Bray v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1355-D, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130940, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2016). However, the Bray plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he sent a complete application with the additional information that the defendant requested. Id.The court held that alleging specific facts was enough to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id.

Contrary to the plaintiffs' complaints in Bray and Obazee, Guerrero's complaint does nothing more than provide a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. In Bray and Obazee, the plaintiffs provided a factual basis for their claims and allowed the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants were liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bray, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130940 at *8; Obazee,2015 WL 4602971 at *3. The court finds that without some factual allegations on when Guerrero submitted a complete loss mitigation application, Guerrero's claim does not rise beyond a speculative level. The court agrees with BANA that this claim is insufficient to meet the pleading standard necessary to allege a violation of Regulation X of the C.F.R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Therefore, BANA's motion to dismiss Guerrero's claim for violation of Regulation X of the C.F.R. is GRANTED.

D. Violation of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act

In his complaint, Guerrero alleges that BANA violated the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act ("TDCPA") by accelerating the debt and posting Guerrero's property for foreclosure. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 14-15. Guerrero argues that BANA did not provide him with a notice of default and opportunity to cure. Id. He also states that BANA's actions constitute a knowing "misrepresentation of character, amount or extent of the debt to be collected, and . . . false representations of material fact." Id. at 15. In response, BANA makes three arguments: (1) BANA is not a debt collector as defined in the TDCPA; (2) Guerrero fails to allege any facts that would establish a causal link between a violation of the TDCPA and any alleged injury; and (3) Guerrero fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Dkt. 6 at 15-17.

The TDCPA is a state law that allows a consumer to sue for "threats, coercion, harassment, abuse, unconscionable collection methods, or misrepresentations made in connection with the collection of a debt." Dominguez v. Ben. Fin. I, Inc., No. B:14-67, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184166, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015) (Morgan, J.). Under the Act, a "debt collector" is a "person who directly or indirectly engages in debt collection and includes a person who sells or offers to sell forms represented to be a collection system, device, or scheme intended to be used to collect consumer debts." Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6). Further, a "debt collection" is an "action, conduct, or practice, in collecting, or in soliciting for collection, consumer debts that are due or alleged to be due a creditor." Id. § 392.001(5). BANA argues that BANA is not a collector subject to the Act because the Assignment established BANA as a mortgagee, and BANA was collecting on a debt that it was rightfully due. Dkt. 6 at 15-16.

The court notes that BANA may be considered a "debt collector" and that an "act of foreclosure is `debt collection' for purposes of the TDCPA." See Sias v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. EP-12-cv-417-PRM, 2013 WL 8476169, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2013) (holding that Wells Fargo is a "debt collector" for the purposes of the TDCPA); see also Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing the definition of a "debt collector" under the TDCPA from the more restrictive definition under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)).

Although the Texas Supreme Court has not conclusively addressed the issue, federal courts in Texas have ruled that a foreclosure may be considered debt collection activity. Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734-35 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (holding that a foreclosure is considered "debt collection" under the TDCPA); Gatling v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. H-11-2879, 2012 WL 3756581, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2012) (Rosenthal, J.) (finding CitiMortgage to be a "debt collector" under the TDCPA's broader definition); Akintunji v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., No. H-11-389, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65050, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2011) (Rosenthal, J.) ("Unlike the FDCPA, the TDCPA encompasses foreclosure activities by mortgage holders."). The definition of a "debt collector" may include anyone who engages in debt collection, whether directly or indirectly, and this also encompasses creditors collecting their own debts. Auriti v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-334, 2013 WL 2417832, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2013) (Costa, J.) ("TDC[P]A's general definition of `debt collector' is more expansive . . . and may include mortgage holders and servicers."). BANA is attempting to collect on the mortgage loan and to foreclose on Guerrero's Property. Therefore, the TDCPA applies to BANA for its foreclosure activity.

The court, however, finds that Guerrero fails to state a plausible claim under the TDCPA. Guerrero alleges that (1) BANA did not send him a notice of default or provide an opportunity to cure, and (2) that BANA's actions constitute false representations of material fact. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 14-15. These statements are little more than conclusory allegations. Guerrero does not allege why BANA's statements were false or why BANA's actions were misrepresentations of material fact. Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304. BANA's failure to respond to Guerrero's attempt to obtain a loan modification is not grounds for relief under the TDCPA. Bassie v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 4:12-cv-00891, 2012 WL 6530482, at *13-14 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2012) (Hoyt, J.) (holding that TDCPA claims do not include a lender's failure to respond to borrower's attempt to obtain a loan modification). The court finds that Guerrero's allegation that BANA failed to respond to his application falls short of a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, BANA's motion to dismiss the TDCPA claim is GRANTED.

E. Guerrero's Claim Against MERS

BANA argues that Guerrero names MERS as a defendant but does not assert any claims against MERS. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 9. BANA notes that Counts 1-5 in the complaint only relate to BANA's actions. Dkt. 6 at 9-10. Guerrero's only allegation against MERS is that MERS "executed the Assignment `without ever providing any written notice to [Guerrero].'" Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A at 8.

The court has reviewed the complaint and finds that Guerrero has not asserted any claims against MERS. Merely executing an assignment does not raise an actionable claim. Therefore, BANA's motion to dismiss MERS as a defendant is GRANTED.

F. Temporary Restraining Order

In his original state court petition, Guerrero moved for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. Id. at 10. On January 3, 2017, the 11th Judicial District Court of Harris County granted the temporary restraining order, prohibiting BANA from proceeding with a foreclosure sale of Guerrero's home. Id. at 43. The order enjoined and restrained BANA for a period of fourteen days, or until a further court order. Id.Because the state court has already granted a temporary restraining order, and no new motion for a temporary injunction was filed in federal court, this claim is DENIED AS MOOT.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, BANA's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) is GRANTED. MERS is DISMISSED as a defendant. Guerrero's motion for a temporary injunction is DENIED AS MOOT. Guerrero's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

It is so ORDERED.

[1] Guerrero filed all of the state court documents within Dkt. 1, Exhibit A. Throughout this opinion, the court will refer to Dkt. 1, Exhibit A and its relevant page numbers.

Consumer Protection Division of the Texas AG's Office vs Debt Collection Attorney Joseph Onwuteaka and Samara Portfolio Management LLC - The fight ain't over yet

Joseph O. Onwuteaka gives Texas Attorney General's Office headaches in enforcement action stemming from massive venue violations by Onwuteaka in debt collection suits filed in the name of Samara Portfolio Management, LLC against Texas consumers.   
Houston-based attorney Joe Onwuteaka should be nominated for some sort of “survivor” award. He is a frequent tax-suit defendant, having been sued by local taxing authorities more than a dozen times (many of which resulted in nonsuits), and a veteran of the attorney disciplinary system, with three suspensions on the State Bar profile page, which he has not updated since 2006.

The Harris and Fort Bend County court records paint an even more colorful picture.

In 2012 speedy Joe got caught driving erratically on the Southwest Freeway, and had his license suspended for refusing to submit what would likely have been an incriminating specimen. That suspension involved his driver’s license only, not his license to practice law. According to the arresting officer, Onwuteaka identified himself as a licensed attorney, but he was hauled off with hands secured behind his back for processing and booking anyhow, after not cooperating in the field sobriety test and refusing to blow at 2AM in the morning while emitting tell-tale fumes. So the officer had sufficient other indicia of probable cause, as detailed in the police report.

Apparently he still has it. -- His bar card. And apparently, he is still practicing law. But there are clouds on the horizon.

THE SAMARA PORTFOLIO SCHEME 

Unlike other collection attorneys busy in mass litigation, many of who don’t last long because they either get canned by the collection lawfirm that hires them, or by the client if they work for a creditor directly, Joe  developed his own business model for making the most of a chunk of the bad-debt after-market.

Rather than hiring himself out to financial institutions or to debt buyers, he would buy the bad debts himself (in the name of a limited liability company owned by him and his wife), and would then retain himself to collect on these debts. Technically he and his SAMARA PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC are legally distinct. But both are debt collectors, and both are being sued by the Texas Attorney General for debt collection violations committed by Onwuteaka on a massive scale and as a pattern of practice: Filing collection suits against consumer debtors in a court convenient to Onwuteaka (Harris County Justice Court Precinct 1, Place 2 in Downtown Houston) even though the defendants did not live in Harris County and their cases had no connection to Harris County. Suing consumers in the wrong venue violates both federal and state law. -->   FDCPA

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY RAP SHEET 

Onwuteaka has drawn the attention of the attorney disciplinary system on numerous occasions. The Commission on Lawyer Discipline sued him no less than seven times in Harris County District Court, and before that it was the District Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas.  In 2007 and 2009, he was under (probated) suspension for part of the year. The most recent disciplinary case in Harris County (2010-10545) is shown as pending, but a joint motion to dismiss it has been on file since 2010. In 2008, Onwuteaka agreed to a public reprimand and payment of $2,000 in attorneys’ fees to the Commission.

Like I said, he is a survivor.

Whether he will survive, professionally and financially, the Attorney General’s pending enforcement action arising from his pattern and practice of venue violations in hundreds of cases he brought against Texas consumers is another matter.

THE TEXAS AG’S ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST ONWUTEAKA AND SAMARA PORTFOLIO 

In 2013 the Attorney General's Office, then still headed by Greg Abbott, sued Onwuteaka, his law firm, LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPH ONWUTEAKA, and his company, SAMARA PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC, under the Texas Debt Collection Act (which is the state-level counterpart to the FDCPA) and the DTPA, alleging that he had sued hundreds of consumers in the wrong county.

The OAG handles a variety of different types of litigation. This one was brought by the Consumer Protection Division in the name of  The State of Texas. The filing attorney (attorney in charge) was and remains Rick Berlin. As is the AG’s standard practice, the attorneys at the higher levels in the OAG's hierarchy are also listed on the pleadings,

Cases filed with the Harris County District Clerk are randomly assigned to one of the many courts serving the same jurisdiction. State of Texas v Samara Portfolio Management, LLC, et al ended up in the 80th District Court, presided over by Judge Larry Weiman, a Democrat elected in 2008 as part of the Obama sweep in Harris County, and re-elected in 2012. This is a civil case. When it is over and done with, Onwuteake won’t go to jail (unless he is found in contempt or prosecuted for  any criminal offenses separately.)

The State’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction was filed on June 14, 2013. Assistant Attorney General Rick Berlin signed it as attorney in charge.
Another Assistant Attorney General, Rosemarie Donnelly, is also on the pleadings, as Tommy Prud'Homme, the Chief of the Consumer Protection Division.

The AG action seeks damages, restitution, and injunctive relief. The petition alleged that the defendants violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Debt Collection Act ("TDCA") and asks for hefty penalties of $20,000 per violation, and other relief.

The petition has since been amended.

A DRAWN-OUT BATTLE 

Bad Boy Onwuteaka  has put up a helluvo a fight. Perhaps he got the sense that this is the fight of his life; -- his professional life as a debt company owner and collector anyhow. As of May 2015, the online docket sheet for his case is 8 pages long, and mostly reflects filings related to telephonic and video depositions of consumers sued by Onwuteaka, and discovery disputes. This includes multiple successive motions to compel and for sanctions brought against Onwuteaka for failure to comply with discovery requests.

This is a big case because so many people were the target of Onwuteaka’s debt collection abuses.

First 25 names of more than 900 people sued in wrong county, with place service shown in
in column marked yellow. (Attorney General's Exhibit) 

Trial has been set and reset several times because the assistant attorney general who is actively litigating the case for the Attorney General’s Office has not be able to secure Onwuteaka’s complete co-operation in producing documents, and is therefore not ready to try the case.

Onwuteaka also filed counterclaims against the Attorney General. But he lost on those by way of summary judgment, along with having impermissible defenses struck from his answer.

April 10, 2015 Order dismissing Onwuteaka's counterclaim  

After four continuances, trial on the Attorney Generals’ claims against Onwuteaka and his law office and company is now set for October, 26. 2015.

Stay tuned!

FOURTH MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 

Motion for Continuance (to reset trial to a later date) 

SUMMARY: This blog post provides an update on the enforcement action filed by the Texas Attorney General's Office in the name of the State of Texas in 2013 against debt collection attorney Joseph O. Onwuteaka aka Joseph Osochukwu Onwuteaka, his law firm, and his company, Samara Portfolio Management, LLC. It also offers information on this attorney's disciplinary history.  
   
CASE STYLE: State of Texas v Samara Portfolio Management, LLC et al; Cause No. 2013-35721 in the 80th Judicial District Court of Texas (Harris County)