Showing posts with label debt-collection-attorney-review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt-collection-attorney-review. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Debt Collector Profile: John C. Adams - Attorney in charge of Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton's Student Loan Collection Shop

JOHN C. ADAMS, Assistant Attorney General (Review)
John C. Adams is the State's student loan collector-in-chief. Not his official title, but a fitting moniker, considering what he does day-in, day-out. The loans at issue are administered by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) and Adams takes them to court for collection when ex-students or their parents (or other co-signers) don't pony up.
By the thousands.
These are State of Texas loans, not federal student loans or private student loans. They are governed by statute. Chapter 52 of the Texas Education Code, to be specific. 
The most common ones are TEXAS B-ON-TIME (BT) loans and COLLEGE ACCESS LOANS (CAL) (current program description here), but there are others, including conditional grants or scholarships that are converted to repayable loans if the conditions for the grant are not met, such as when the student drops out of the program funded by the grant/loan.
A WELL-OILED MACHINE - THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STUDENT LAWSUIT MILL
Adams has been at it since 1999. He presides over a highly automated lawsuit production system with few employees geared up to produce default judgments (mostly) at a rapid rate with a minimum amount of effort and time expenditure. In other words, highly efficient. If a trial is needed or a hearing is requested on a case, Adams typically budgets 5 minutes for an in-court appearance. Unfortunately for Texas consumers, the cost-savings associated with the economies of scale are not passed on to them, as will be detailed below.
VENUE IN TRAVIS COUNTY
All State student loan collection suits are filed at the Travis County Courthouse, which is located within a few blocks of Adams' office at 300 W 15th St., Austin TX 78701-1649.
Documents to be filed with the court are assembled using electronic litigation forms (templates) into which a few pieces of variable data (such as name and address of Defendant, and amount of the alleged balance outstanding) are entered either manually or by using file merge functionality on office software. As a result, the documents in student loan case files are almost identical. They can be viewed by pulling up the docket sheet on the County Clerk's website, and selecting the "Document Event" option from the menu. The easiest way to access a case docket is by entering the cause number (if known) on the search screen. For research purposes, sets of cases can also be identified by searching for name of attorney or name of party (here "STATE OF TEXAS") and specifying a date range.

SERVICE OF SUIT PAPERS: CITATION, ORIGINAL PETITION, AND EXHIBITS

Adams sues student loan obligors wherever they live, whether in the State of Texas, or elsewhere. If they live in-state, he has them served by private process servers (rather than by certified mail or constable/sheriff). It they live out of state, he has them served by the Texas Secretary of State by certified mail. Sometimes, the original address of the defendant is incorrect or no longer current. Adams may then file an amended pleading with the updated address, and have it served. 
STUDENT LOAN CASE DOCUMENTS
The principal documents in a student loan case filed by John C. Adams consist of the following:
The PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION shows the Plaintiff as 'STATE OF TEXAS' or “THE STATE OF TEXASE” in the case style. This document has a copy of the signed promissory note or similar contract document and a loan disclosure page attached to it. If several loans are involved, there will be several such exhibits, usually bearing exhibit stickers A, B, C and so one, respectively -- one for each set of loan origination documents. There are a limited number of petition templates to accommodate the differences between loans and conditional grants, and the distinctions between in-state and out-of-state defendants. Within a category, the pleadings look alike except for the basic case-level data, i.e. defendant identity information and amount of principal. This is because they are all prepared with the same document template. Defendants are identified with prior names or alias, if applicable, address, and social security number. The latter is blackened out, or – in legal speak – redacted, because such data is sensitive and protected by privacy laws and rules.
The CITATION is normally prepared by the clerk of the court, but is here pre-printed as part of the AG student loan pleading template. It is served either by a process server or via the Texas Secretary of State (in the case of out-of-state debtors). After service on the defendant, the private process server will file a RETURN OF SERVICE in the form of a declaration under penalties of perjury attesting to service (with date and manner of service) or a declaration/affidavit of DUE DILIGENCE detailing service attempts that were unsuccessful. In the latter case, a motion for alternate service will likely be filed, unless the address for the Defendant was bad. 
A MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT is filed when the Defendant does not answer by the time his or her written answer is due, as stated on the CITATION. The motion is a one-page document accompanied by an affidavit by Cheryl Bellesen titled AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FINAL JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT and an attorney fee affidavit by John C. Adams, the attorney who signs all pleadings and motions, and is the attorney in charge under rule 8 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. AG Ken Paxton’s name is on the pleadings, but he is too busy to handle garden-variety litigation of this sort. A proposed default judgment is filed with the motion.
If the Defendant files an answer, and by doing so contests the lawsuit, a motion for default judgment is no longer appropriate under the rules governing civil suits, regardless of whether the answer is filed without a lawyer (pro se) or through an attorney. An attorney will typically file a document labeled DEFENDANT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER which will – at the minimum – contain a general denial. Some attorney’s also raise other issues. When an answer is filed by or on behalf of a student loan defendant,  Adams can be expected to file a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT because such a motion is the next-best procedural mechanism to quickly obtain a judgment in the creditor's favor.
In Texas state courts, it is enough to file a "general denial" to contest the case, which puts the burden on the Plaintiff to prove its cause of action, here breach of promissory note/loan agreement or breach of guaranty, depending on whether the student or the co-signer is named as the defendant. In student loan cases litigated by Adams, however, the evidence submitted to support a default judgment is virtually the same as the evidence submitted in support of summary judgment. These cases rarely reach the trial stage because they are disposed of by resort to alternative means: Motion for Default Judgment or Motion for Summary Judgment, Agreed Judgment, or formal agreement for a payment plan and associated stay of litigation. 
The motion filed in lieu of a motion for entry of default will be titled PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and will be accompanied by an affidavit by Cheryl Bellesen titled AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and by an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES by John C. Adams. 
All affidavits on the merits of the State's claim are signed by CHERYL BELLESEN, and are notarized by KATHERINE M. BUXTON, who is a notary without bond because she works in the Attorney General's Office, i.e. for the State of Texas. Buxton is a Legal Secretary and performs administrative functions, such as interacting with the clerks of the Travis County Courts at Law, in which the State's student loan cases are prosecuted.
Both a motion for entry of default judgment and a motion for summary judgment will have a proposed judgment attached, but it will not be titled "proposed" because Adams expects it to be signed as drafted (or rather, as computer-generated). The presiding judges of the county courts, Judge TODD WONG and Judge ERIC SHEPPERD, will normally sign Adams' judgments as presented, but may occasionally revise the amount of attorney's fees (downward) and may occasionally cross out interest or change the rate, if they find an error in the documentation. This is highly unlikely to happen in the default judgment context, however, because no one will be before the court to lodge any objections, or to point out any errors or omissions. Assistant Attorney General Adams himself does not make an in-court appearance for default judgments. The paperwork is simply submitted to the court by his legal secretary for approval and signing by either one of the two presiding judges (or, in rare instances, a visiting judge).  
NONSUIT, AGREED JUDGMENT, MOTIONS TO CONSOLIDATE
Occasionally, Assistant AG Adams files a nonsuit (voluntary dismissal) or a motion to consolidate two cases against the same defendant or two cases involving the same debt initially brought against a former student and the guarantor under two separate cause numbers, or an agreement for a payment plan signed by the Defendant. In the latter scenario, the case might be put on hold (stayed or abated). A great many cases, however, proceed speedily to a default judgment in the absence of a timely answer the Defendant or an agreement, provided that the service of citation was successful. If not, a motion for substitute service will likely be filed.

Debtors represented by attorney will also promptly face a motion for summary judgment (served on their attorney, instead of directly on them), but will have a better chance of such motion being postponed. It will thus win them time, even if they ultimately have a judgment entered against them. Apart from a delay in entry of judgment, the most attorneys for debtors can typically accomplish is a reduction of attorney’s fees, or a consolidation of cases when the attorney is hired to represent both the student-obligor and the co-signer, which will also likely yield a reduction in fees awarded because the duplication of fees is eliminated. 
AGREED JUDGMENTS, like default judgment, are uncontested, but - unlike default judgment, have been expressly agreed to by the Defendant and are signed by the Defendant in addition to being signed by Adams (for the State as Plaintiff) and by the judge. That means they are unappealable, but such an agreed judgment will nevertheless state that it is appealable because that language is on the template that Adams uses to submit such judgments.
Other agreements, such a payment plan, are in the nature of a contract and do not require the court's approval or signature.
Adams' agreed judgments typically reflect at best a reduction of the amount of attorney's fees from what they would otherwise be, but no reduction of principal or interest. Agreed judgment can generally not be attacked after they are signed by the court, which distinguishes them from default judgments, which may be appealed or attacked by post-judgment motion, albeit subject to certain rather unforgiving deadlines.
DISPOSITION BY DEFAULT: THE STANDARD PATTERN
In a large number of cases, the Defendants, who reside in locations all over the State (and some even beyond), never file an answer, and Adams then promptly moves for default judgment with two above-mentioned affidavits, one by Cheryl Bellesen attesting to the amounts owed (broken down by principal, accrued interest, and late fees, if any) and the applicable post-judgment interest rate (typically between 5% and 6%, in some cases as high as 9%) and an affidavit on attorney's fees.
UPPING THE ANTE WITH ATTORNEY'S FEES
Adams pleads for "not less than" $750.00 or $1,000 in attorney's fees in the petition that is served on the Defendant, but he routinely swears to a higher amount as reasonable and necessary once he moves for default or summary judgment.
Even if a Defendant answers the lawsuit, thus preventing a default judgment, he or she will not be able to effectively counter the fee claim because the reasonableness and necessity of attorney's fees is considered a matter on which expert testimony is required. Adam's boilerplate fee affidavit ipso facto qualifies as "expert testimony" because he is an attorney. It does not matter that it comes from an assembly line.
Courts take fee testimony as true (even if it is not) because it is not contested, and routinely enter judgment in the amount requested. If it comes to trial, pro se defendants face the same predicament. They are not qualified to offer testimony on attorney's fees because they are lay persons, and they will not even be aware of the large caseload Adams oversees, and how little time he actually spends on a single case.
ADAMS GETS HIS WAY
The county courts in Austin (Travis County) that process these student loan cases routinely grant everything Adams asks for, including $1,500 - $5,000 in attorney’s fees even though Adams would have spent less than an hour, probably more likely no more than a few minutes, on any one single case. With rare exceptions, such as when an attorney for a debtor challenges venue or the Bellesen’s affidavit, thus forcing Adams to do a little extra work, they are all cookie-cutter cases. If service on the defendant is successful and the defendant does nothing, a default judgment will be entered in due course.
Adams typically brings separate lawsuits against the student and the guarantor, and seeks separate judgments against the two defendants on the same debt (thus doubling the amount), and also duplicates the award of attorney's fees by pursuing this dual-track strategy. He may agree to consolidate such parallel lawsuits on the same debt, but that will likely only happen if both Defendant are represented by a single attorney, which is rare. Most Defendants do not have the benefit of legal assistance and are sitting ducks, to put it metaphorically.  
Two county courts process hundreds of student loan cases ("hear" would be a misleading term, given the prevalence of default judgments without court appearance) and do not require Adams to support the affidavit testimony on the amount outstanding in principal and interest with accounting records of any kind. Adams therefore does not submit any, basing the request for judgment solely on the testimony of Cheryl Bellesen. 
The only bits of data that vary among cases are the type and number of loans and amounts owed, the interest rate, the amount of attorney's fees, and the information that identifies the Defendant. Bellesen does not even specifically state whether the Defendant owes the money based on having signed the loan agreement/promissory note as student borrower, or whether the Defendant is being sued as a co-signer / guarantor. The remainder of her testimony is boilerplate, including the assertion that the Defendant has missed as many as six installment payments, which is what the Texas Education Code requires to trigger acceleration of the outstanding balance that would otherwise be payable over the course of many years, like a mortgage. Bellesen does not state in what amount monthly payments were required to be made by a particular defendant, and no documentation containing this information is submitted to the court (except, in rare instances, where it comes to a bench trial).  
The only documentation Adams typically provides to support a motion seeking judgment for the State are the loan origination documents (promissory note/cosigner guaranty and disclosure statement), which obviously do not reflect any payment history.
ATTORNEY ETHICS
As an assistant attorney general, Adams is not subject to the fair debt collection laws and routinely engages in litigation conduct that would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of consumer protection laws, if private collection attorneys and debt collection law firms engaged in it. Including those enforced by the same Attorney General, i.e. Texas Debt Collection Act and DTPA. 
Suing student loan obligors and guarantors in a county in which they do not reside is a practice that is mandated by statute, as the Education Code states that all such suits shall be filed in Travis County (Austin). Relative to the State as a whole, Austin is a small city and only a small percentage of the entire population of student loan obligors lives there. The vast majority of such Defendants are therefore faced with a lawsuit in a distant forum. In one recent instance, Adams even sued a Defendant long-distance in Japan. He regularly sues them in other states, serving them through the Texas Secretary of State.  
As to where student loan collection suits are filed, the Attorney General has no choice, though the mandatory venue provision was likely enacted for the Attorney General's convenience and efficiency in denigration of the competing interest of the Defendants, who would otherwise be entitled to defend a lawsuit in the county where they live.
The actual conduct of litigation, however, is a different matter. There is choice in how the Attorney General goes about managing the student loan caseload, and how he treats debtors, and some of the standard practices engaged in by Assistant AG Adams, with approval of his superiors - ultimately AG Ken Paxton - are both properly characterized as deceptive and abusive, as will be demonstrated below.
Deceptive representation as to the amount of damages and attorney's fees sought
When student loan defendants are served with law suit papers but do not answer, Adams promptly submits a motion for default judgment with an affidavit by Cheryl Bellesen that states the amount of principal, the amount of accrued interest, and the amount of late charges (if any). In some cases, the accrued interest is a substantial portion of the total. In the case of very old loans, the accrued interest may exceed half the amount of the principal, even if the interest rate is low (typically between 5 and 7 per cent).
When he files the original petitions, however, Adams only states the dollar amount of "the principal sum" even though the information on the full amount of the judgment he will be seeking is readily available. The difference is hidden in the phrase "plus interest." Why would Adams not state the full amount in the petition? The obvious answer is that a Defendant is less likely to fight the lawsuit if the amount of the debt is understated and is much lower than the amount of the judgment that will ultimately ensue.
The same with the attorney's fees. Adams plead a dollar figure for attorney's fees in most of his original petitions (either $750.00 or $1,000.00, depending on the type/amount of the loan), but he qualifies this specific dollar amount with the term “not less than” (In some cases, attorney's fees are mentioned, but no dollar figure is stated). 



At the point in time when Adams files the original petition, he knows that he will be asking for at least $1,500.00 in attorney’s fees, and as much as $5,000.00 in cases that involve higher loan balances. He knows this because seeking judgment for attorney’s fees in the range of $1,500.00 to $5,000.00 is an integral component of his office's standard operating procedures, and Adams personally signs and dates each one of the fee affidavits (assuming an image of his signature is not attached electronically). Needless to say, Defendants are generally not privy to this superior knowledge of the Attorney General's collection policies and practices, and associated standard operating procedures.


Example of Fee Aff from Default Judgment Case for $5,000.00 
While technically a pleaded claim for no less than $1,000 does not preclude a claim for $5,000, and can therefore not be said to be categorically false, it is nevertheless deceptive because a lay reader of ordinary intelligence will look at the specific dollar figure, and will not read and interpret "at least $1,000" as $1,000 times five, i.e. $5,000.00. 
Nor would it be reasonable for a defendant to reckon that the State's attorney will spend much time on the case if the Defendant decides not to contest it. Much rather, it would be reasonable for the defendant to assume that by not fighting the lawsuit, he or she will ease the workload for the State (and mitigate the State's damages, to the extent staff attorney time can be considered damages), and thereby keep the attorney's fees low. Notwithstanding, a defendant who does not respond to the lawsuit will then be hit with a default judgment that includes an award of attorney's fees that is higher than the $750.00 or $1,000.00 dollar figure in the petition that was served on the defendant.
Motions for default judgment are, in fact, highly automated and involve minimal attorney involvement. Just like the pleadings filed to open a new case, these motions all look alike except for a few case-level particulars such as defendant name, amount of principal and interest, and the applicable interest rate (5.25% for most loans, judgment interest of 5% if no interest rate is specified on the note). The affidavits in support of default are also very similar. Mass-produced with document production software. The attached promissory notes differ, or course, but they are preexisting documents, not documents created in the course of litigation.   
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR EMPLOYMENT: JOHN C. ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General John C. Adams was in private practice as a solo from May 1996 to 1999. He reports that prior to that he was an Associate at Hull & Associates, P.C., which is a Houston debt collection firm owned by James N. Hull.
Texas court records also reflect that Adams was affiliated with FREEDMAN, HULL, MATHEWS & PRICE, P.C. in the early 1990s.
John C. Adams mostly represented companies and financial institutions while in private practice of law in Houston, Texas.
Adams is a graduate of the UH Law Center and was licensed in 1989, just a few months after he received his JD degree from U of H. His State Bar of Texas license number (SBOT or TBN number) is 00865800 and his public profile on State Bar's website does not reflect any derogatory disciplinary history. 
 
SAMPLE DOCUMENTS FROM AG STUDENT LOAN 

SUITS IN TRAVIS COUNTY  

[ANONYMIZED] 

ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVITS 






OLDER VERSION OF STANDARD FEE AFF WITHOUT AN HOURLY RATE (2013) 
EXAMPLE OF WHAT A DEFAULT JUDGMENT LOOKS LIKE   



EXAMPLE OF MOTION FOR  DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT 






GETTING SUED LONG-DISTANCE OUT OF STATE 


LIVING OUT OF STATE IN NY - NO PROBLEM - WE GOT JURISDICTION OVER YOU 
Being sued by Texas AG in California 

EXAMPLE OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT 




EXAMPLE OF NONSUIT IN AG STUDENT LOAN SUIT 



EXAMPLE OF CONSOLIDATION OF TWO CASES INTO ONE   


Saturday, January 10, 2015

Mark Rechner - Debt Collection Attorney Profile




ABOUT MARK RECHNER 

PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION,
LITIGATION RECORD, AND TYPICAL PLEADINGS 

Mark Rechner, whose full name is Mark August Rechner, is a Dallas-based debt collection attorney with the lawfirm Vincent Lopez Serafino Jenevein PC. He received his law degree from Baylor University in 2007 and was admitted to practice of law by the Texas Supreme Court that same year. Attorney Rechner does not provide any details regarding his practice or specific services on the his official State Bar profile page, which was last certified 1/29/2014. Nor does Attorney Rechner's official profile feature a photo or a hotlink to his firm's website.

This attorney profile includes information obtained from court record and other sources.

LICENSE NUMBER AND NAME VARIANTS 

This attorney's name appears as MARK RECHNER on pleadings (without middle initial). The State Bar shows his attorney's complete legal name as MARK AUGUST RECHNER. There is no problem with confusion in the legal profession because there are no other Texas attorneys that share the same last name. There is, however, a person with the same name at JPMorgan, an Executive Director in Sydney Australia, who previously worked for Deutsche Bank. There are also a few other people with the same first and last name on LinkedIn, including one in Houston, albeit in the different industry. The surname "Rechner" is German in origin and means "calculator" or, in modern parlance, "computer".

STATE BAR NUMBER FOR ATTORNEY MARK A. RECHNER: 24058064

COMPLAINT HISTORY 

The State Bar of Texas (SBOT) reports no public disciplinary history for this attorney.

LAWFIRM AFFILIATION AND ADDRESS 

VINCENT LOPEZ SERAFINO JENEVEIN, P.C.
1601 Elm Street, Ste 4100
Dallas, Texas 75201
214-979-7400
214-979-7402

OTHER ATTORNEYS WITH THE SAME FIRM, CURRENT OR FORMER

Thomas M. Sellers (on the pleadings in firm address block)

Thomas Sellers, Attorney at Vincent Lopez Serafino Jenevein, PC, is also a graduate of Baylor University Law School. He earned his BA at the University of Texas in Austin in 2006.

There are other lawyers with this firm, which is active on a wider spectrum of the legal services market geared toward the corporate/business sector, but their names do not appear in consumer debt suit litigation.

STAFF AND OTHER RELATED PERSONS 

Notaries used by Mark Rechner: Amy R. Martinez; Maida Lerma; Jolene Hall; Jason T. Palguta
Legal Assistant: Amy R. Martinez

OTHER PROFESSIONAL PROFILES 

According to Attorney Mark Rechner's LinkedIn page, he has been with his current employer since 2007, i.e. eight years. He is identified as a "Law Practice Professional" with Waco, Texas as this practice area. The LinkedIn profile reports his prior employer as Vincent Moye. This Mark Rechner (there are others with the same name) has 114 connections on LinkedIn.

CREDITORS ON WHOSE BEHALF MARK RECHNER FILES LAWSUITS 

WELLS FARGO BANK NA (original debt suits and garnishment actions after judgment)

CASES IN HARRIS COUNTY (HOUSTON) 

For the time period 2010-2014 Attorney Mark Rechner is listed as attorney of record in 32 cases in Harris County Civil Courts at Law. All recent cases are either garnishment actions filed against banks or other entities believed to be holding funds owned by debtors who ended up with judgments, or cases seeking other post-judgment relief, such as turnover of assets.

For the same four-year time period, Attorney Mark Rechner is listed as attorney of record in 439 cases in Harris County District Courts, 118 of which were filed in 2014. While the majority of debt case are filed in county courts at law, the Wells Fargo collection suits handled by Rechner are filed in district courts. These are much more numerous than the county courts at law. New cases are assigned randomly. Wells Fargo debt collection suits come in four categories: DEBT, CONTRACT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, and GARNISHMENT cases. The debt, contract, and breach cases, however, are not really distinguishable because these are overlapping classifications on the district clerk's docketing system.

CASES IN FORT BEND COUNTY  
CASES IN DALLAS COUNTY 

COMMENT ON PLEADINGS FILED BY THIS TEXAS LAWYER 

Attorney Rechner's standard petition consists of four pages. Like the Texas attorneys for ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES Rechner pleads breach of contract as the sole theory. He no longer includes alternative legal theories that are equitable in nature. Such theories are incompatible with the presence of a formal written contract that control the claim and the relationship of the parties.

--> Express contract precludes equitable relief.

The case-specific content in a standard petition in credit card debt cases includes the account origination date. The underlying contract is referenced as "Wells Fargo Consumer Credit Card Customer Agreement and Disclosure Statement" (see image at the bottom of this page).

American Express also used to have wordy and unwieldy titles on its cardmember agreement, but has since replaced them with new versions that have the name of the cardholder(s) printed on Part 1. Wells Fargo, by contrast, still relies on oddly captioned generic cardmember agreements that contain neither the name of the customer, nor the account number. The account-specific credit terms are printed on a separate document. This makes sense because those terms vary among account holders based on the credit scores, spending and payment history, and other risk-related variables that the bank consideres in pricing decisions. Unlike some other debt collection attorneys, Rechner does not attach the cardmember agreement or any other exhibits to his collection suit petitions; nor does he serve any discovery requests with the initial pleading.

APPLICATIONS FOR WRIT OF GARNISHMENT 

In his garnishment applications, Attorney Rechner does not reveal what research was undertaken to determine the facts upon which the application for writ of garnishment is based. A garnishment is a separate lawsuit brought against a bank or other entity that is believed to hold assets that belong to the judgment defendant. The purpose of the action is to capture those funds in satisfaction (or partial satisfaction) of the underlying judgment. The most common type of a garnishment actions is against a bank at which the judgment debtor has a checking or savings account. The garnishment is brought against the bank, but the judgment-debtor must also be given notice, and may contest the garnishment and seek dissolution of the writ, if there are legitimate grounds for it. Some types of funds, such as social security benefits, for example, are protected and are not subject to garnishment.

SAMPLE DOCUMENTS / SNIPPETS OF PLEADINGS FILED BY ATTORNEY RECHNER 

EXCERPT FROM A WELLS FARGO PETITION FILED IN DECEMBER 2014 THAT STATES A BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIM ONLY, PLUS A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES


EXCERPT FROM OLDER ORIGINAL PETITION FILED BY MARK RECHNER IN WELLS FARGO BANK DEBT CASE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED THEORIES PLEADED DESPITE CLAIM BASED ON LOAN CONTRACT (BREACH OF CONTRACT).


MARK RECHNER'S LAW FIRM ADDRESS BLOCK FROM PLEADING, AND SAMPLE JOHN HANCOCK. Note: Some of the pleading are apparently signed by his colleague Tom Sellers, even though Rechner is designated as attorney in charge.

Sample signature and lawfirm address block: Mark Rechner


FEE AFFIDAVIT WITH TESTIMONY ON HOURLY RATES


EXCERPT FROM GARNISHMENT APPLICATION - AFFIDAVIT



WHAT A WELLS FARGO CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT LOOKS LIKE 



LINKS TO RELATED PAGES 

Profile of law firm: VINCENT LOPEZ SERAFINO JENEVEIN
Directory of creditors and collectors: WHO IS WHO IN DEBT COLLECTION IN TEXAS
Creditor profile: Credit Card Debt Suits by Wells Fargo Bank N. A.

EDITORIAL NOTES AND HISTORY: This profile was first posted on 1/10/2015 and has since been updated with a name of a notary public.  The SBOT and LinkedIn profile pages of Attorney Mark Rechner were last visited on 1/9/2015.





Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Dan G. Young Profile of Attorney with JWY Lawfirm in Lubbock


WHO-IS-WHO AMONG THE CREDITORS’ BAR

Dan G. Young with JENKINS Lawfirm in Lubbock

INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEY PROFILE  OF DEBT COLLECTION ATTORNEY

Dan G. Young is a collection lawyer with Jenkins,Wagnon & Young, LLC

Attorney Dan G. Young has been licensed in Texas since 1983, and in Oklahoma since 2005. Unlike most other collection lawyers, Young is admitted not only to practice all courts of the State of Texas, but in federal district courts and bankruptcy courts in the multiple Districts of Texas; in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; and in the U.S. Supreme Court. His law degree is from Texas Tech University (1983).  

NAME CONFUSION: SEVERAL TEXAS ATTORNEYS WITH SIMILAR NAME 

Young is a common last name. Not surprisingly, there a number of other attorneys with the same last name, and even one with the same first and last name, and a few more with the first name Daniel rather than the short version Dan. It is therefore important to include the middle name to distinguish Dan G Young from other attorneys with very similar names. The official licensing and registration records for Dan G. Young do not reveal what middle name the G stands for.  

Attorney Dan G. Young’s Texas Bar Number is 22177250

LAW FIRM AND COLLEAGUES 

Dan G. Young is a name partner at JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG.. Jody Jenkins and Dan G. Young sign pleadings in debt collection litigation handled by this firm. J. Mark Wagnon devotes himself to other legal matters, which consist in large part of transactional work. Wagnon does not appear as attorney of record in the firm’s collection lawsuits. Like Jenkins and Wagner, Dan G. Young was previously with McCleskey, Harriger, Brazill & Graf, L.L.P., which is true of his partners also. 

Brian Benitez (full name Brian Louis Benitez) is an associate at the firm. He too is a graduate from Texas Tech University School of Law. Benitez was licensed in 2012 and recently joint the firm.

PRACTICE AREAS

Although he is best known as a debt collection lawyer, Attorney Dan G. Young lists a number of other areas of practice on this State Bar profile:  Bankruptcy, Business, Consumer, Creditor-Debtor, Insurance, Labor-Employment, Litigation: Commercial, Real Estate, Other, Finance

ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 

According to his bio on his firm’s website, Dan G. Young was born in Lubbock in 1957, earned his college degree in his home town in 1979, and also went to law school there, earning his JD from Texas Tech University School of Law  in 1983, where he was also on the law review. He was licensed that same year. Young has chosen collection work as his niche in the legal field. He is a member of the National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys  and the American Collectors Association.

FOR WHICH CREDITORS DOES DAN G. YOUNG LITIGATE?

A search on the Harris County District Clerk's websites reveals  Dan G Young as attorney of record in 437 cases. Recent clients include CONVERGING CAPITAL CORPORATION, SIMMONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, CACH LLC, EQUABLE ASCENT FINANCIAL LLC, GLOBAL ACCEPTANCE CREDIT COMPANY.

APPELLATE RECORD IN TEXAS

Dan G. Young has a much more extensive appellate track record than most other debt collection attorneys in Texas. He is listed as attorney in 30 cases, although there are few in recent years.  One of the appeals resulting in a noteworthy opinion involved a debt collection case brought on behalf of Hudson & Keyse, L.L.C. on an assigned Chase Manhattan Bank credit card debt that was appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston. Many appeals in debt collection matters get dismissed for various reasons, such as nonpayment of fees, defective appellant’s brief or none, and lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing of notice of appeal, or for other reasons.  

TYPICAL PETITION IN DEBT SUIT 

Notwithstanding his appellate law credentials, the pleadings filed by Dan G. Young are rudimentary. Like all other debt collection firms, litigation templates are used and suit papers for individual cases are generated with document production software that inserts a few pieces of variable data into the e-template for pleadings, motions, and other documents. While the typical original petition contains a fact section, it may not even feature a separate paragraph on the legal theory of recovery. See sample of fact section: 


ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVITS 

Both Jody Jenkins and Dan G Young seek attorneys fees in debt suits. The typical amount claimed as reasonable, regardless of county in which the suit is filed, is $1,500. See excerpt from sample fee affidavit: 



LAWFIRM ADDRESS AND CONTACT DETAILS FOR DAN G. YOUNG

Dan G. Young
JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG, P.C.
P.O. BOX 420
Lubbock, Texas 79408-0420
Phone: 806-796-7322
Fax: (806) 771-8755




Friday, October 11, 2013

Jody D. Jenkins: Individual Profile of Debt Collection Attorney


WHO-IS-WHO IN THE CREDITORS' / DEBT COLLECTORS' BAR 

Jody D. Jenkins - Profile of Debt Collection Attorney  

Jody Dewayne Jenkins is a debt collection attorney and name partner of JENKINS WAGNON & YOUNG, PC.. a Texas law firm formed in 2011. Jody D. Jenkins was previously associated with McCLESKEY, HARRIGER, BRAZILL & GRAF, L.L.P..

Jenkins was born in Abilene in 1976 and received his law license in May 2001. He is a graduate of Texas Tech.

Mr. Jenkin's SBOT profile, certified on 08/01/2012, does not reflect any public disciplinary history. His Texas Bar Card Number is 24029634. In addition to Texas, Jenkins is also licensed to practice law in New Mexico. He is also admitted to practice in several federal district courts in Texas.

CLIENTS REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY JODY JENKINS 

In Harris County District Courts Jenkins is listed as attorney in 371 cases as of October 2013. Of these 69 were filed in 2010; six in 2011; 74 in 2012; and none in 2013.

A case search by state bar number yields one 2013 case for Jody Jenkins in Harris County District Courts: a declaratory judgment action against the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pertaining to a priority lien claimed by Carmel Financial Corporation based on financing provided for a water treatment system installed at a residence in Katy. The DJA suit was filed in December 2013, but the petition in that case was actually signed by Brian Benitez, although Jenkins is listed first on the address block. Under the Texas Rules of Procedure the attorney that signs the first pleading is the attorney in charge and should have been shown as attorney of record on the docket.  

The overall count for Attorney Jenkins includes numerous lawsuits by MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, a leading buyer of charge-off credit card accounts; UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS, another debt buyer with a massive debt collection dockets across Texas a few years ago; and other bank and nonbank clients, including EDUCAP, INC; U S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ND D/B/A ELAN FINANCIAL SERVICES); RIVERWALK HOLDINGS LTD; PLS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC; JOHN DEERE CONSTRUCTION & FORESTRY COMPANY.

ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVITS 

When Attorney Jenkins files a fee affidavit in a debt collection case brought on behalf of a debt buyer such as Midland, he typically opines that his efforts in a case of such nature are worth $1,500.00. He also pleads for appellate fees: $5,000 for defending an appeal in the first instance, and $3,500 for opposing a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. In his standard fee affidavit, he does not condition these amounts on success in defending a judgment in favor of his client.
  
APPELLATE RECORD

Attorney Jenkins' appellate record includes cases by Crown Asset Management, LLC; Unifund CCR Partners; U.S. Bank National Association, ND; Equity Residential Management, LLC; Midland Funding LLC. Not all cases are debt collection cases filed by banks and debt buyers. Mr. Jenkins also lists other practice areas on his firm's website.

PLAINTIFFS REPRESENTED BY JODY JENKINS IN HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT COURTS IN RECENT YEARS 

CARMEL FINANCIAL CORPORATION INC
DEERE & COMPANY
JOHN DEERE CONSTRUCTION & FORESTRY COMPANY
EDUCAP INC
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
PALISADES COLLECTION LLC
PLS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC
RIVERWALK HOLDING LTD
TROY CAPITAL LLC
U S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ND
UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS

Note: This is not an exhaustive list of clients

ADDRESS INFO FOR ATTORNEY JODY JENKINS

JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG, P.C. (JWY)
P.O. Box 420
Lubbock, Texas 79408-0420
Tel. (806) 687-9172 Fax: (806) 687-1994 (as of 2015)
Old/prior/alt Tel.: (806) 796-7351 Fax: (806) 771-8755

Firm web site URL: www.jwylaw.com [acronym formed by last names of partners with "LAW" added]

Notaries used: Leslie M. Gosnell; Candace Norrod

STREET ADDRESS FOR JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG LAW FIRM: 

1623 10TH ST. LUBBOCK, TEXAS 79401-2685

Editorial note: This profile of Attorney Jody Jenkins was updated on:  July 2, 2015, Jan. 22, 2014.



Sunday, September 15, 2013

Donald D. DeGrasse - Amex collection attorney (profile and critique of pleadings)


DEBT COLLECTION ATTORNEY - INDIVIDUAL PROFILE 

Donald D. DeGrasse 

Donald D. ‘Don’ Degrasse is a debt collection lawyer based in Houston, Texas. In addition to creditor-debtor litigation (which involves large numbers of American Express debt suits), Degrasse lists Commercial Litigation and Real Estate as practice areas. He is a prolific litigator in the trial courts covering a broad array of civil cases, but is not very active in the courts of appeals.

Mr. Degrasse’s law degree is from Indiana University School of Law, where he completed his studies with a JD degree in 1979. He obtained his Texas bar license in 1981.

Attorney DeGrasse's Texas Bar Card Number is 05641800. In addition to the courts of the State of Texas, he is admitted to practice in the US Tax Court and in the U.S. District Court (and Bankruptcy Court) for the Southern District of Texas. Information available from the State Bar of Texas web site indicates that Attorney DeGrasse has no public disciplinary history.

PARTNERS / COLLEAGUES IN SAME FIRM: Robert L. Rolnick (name partner); Kevin T. McGuire

TYPICAL DEGRASSE PETITION IN A DEBT SUIT 

CAUSES OF ACTION: BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT AND ACCOUNT STATED 

What does a typical DeGrasse petition in a debt suit contains (--> Sample DeGrasse Petition)

As causes of action in original creditor suits DeGrasse pleads Breach of Written Contract and Account Stated, each in a separate paragraph (IV and V, respectively).

DeGrasse's two theories are based on the same set of facts. Indeed, the section on "Account Stated" incorporates the allegations that precede it in full. It adds references to account statements sent by the original creditor, and alleges that there were never disputed by the defendant. DeGrasse seeks the same amount of damages on both theories. Unlike Anh Regent's pleading, DeGrasse's do not make any reference to acceleration of maturity of the revolving balance on the account, but characterize the pleaded-for amount of damages as "due and owing" on the account.

DISCOVERY WITHIN THE BODY OF THE PETITION

DeGrasse pleads discovery level 1. His petition template includes Requests for Disclosure and Request for Admission as numbered paragraphs, although the inclusion of the latter is not authorized by the rules of civil procedure, which specifically instruct litigants not to file discovery requests with the court. More on that topic below.

Although they contain discovery requests, DeGrasse's original petitions do not have a designated FACTS or FACTUAL BACKGROUND section separate and apart from the paragraphs devoted to the causes of actions; nor do they contain a CONCLUSION, or PRAYER section denominated as such. The untitled last paragraph lists the damages beings sought, including the amount of "the balance due, owing, and unpaid under the Agreement", court cost, post-judgment interest, and "any further relief to which the Plaintiff may show itself justly entitled." The prayer and list of damages does not include an express request for attorney's fees.

Requests for Admissions. DeGrasse's standard sets of "Requests for Admissions" comprise propositions sought to be admitted numbered with lower-case letters starting with a) through m) or w). There is more than one version of requests for admissions and they differ in length.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEGRASSE 

In Amex debt suits DeGrasse acknowledges that American Express is a Utah bank, and that Utah law is relevant to the case. He nevertheless moves for summary judgment under Texas law on causes of action for breach of contract and account stated, and does not expressly ask for judicial notice and application of Utah law. When the issue comes up in litigation, DeGrasse argues that Amex is entitled to judgment regardless of whether Texas law or Utah law applies.

DEGRASSE MOVES FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEEMED ADMISSIONS

DeGrasse is one of those debt collection attorneys who inserts request for admission into his pleading so as to take advantage of deemed admissions should the defendant fail to answer them. The practice of embedding discovery requests into pleadings is not proper under the rule of civil procedure (which state that discovery shall not be filed), but is not uncommon either. Some debt collection attorneys do it routinely while others do not. Those that do, typically get away with it.

The proper method of serving discovery at the same time as the citation and original petition is to prepare two documents separately, obtain a citation referencing both documents; file the pleading only with the court; but have both the petition and the discovery requests served on the defendant with the citation. Allen L. Adkins, who set a high standard in debt collection litigation and also authored CLE materials, followed that practice as a matter of law firm policy. Few other do. 

Injecting requests for admission into the initial pleading can confuse defendants because the deadline to answer the lawsuit differs from the deadline to answer discovery requests. Additionally, a defendant may be under the impression that the filing of a general denial will also deny the requested admissions, i.e. that it is enough to answer the lawsuit, only to be faced with a motion based on deemed admissions a few weeks later.

DeGrasse routinely files motions for summary judgment based, at least in part, on deemed admissions. Because he has the requests for admissions served as an integral component of the petition itself, he can rely on the return of service in the court's file not only as proof that the lawsuit papers were served on the defendant (for default judgment purposes) but as proof that requests for admissions were also served; and since the requests for admissions are part of the pleadings, their substance is also on file. The rules do not condone this stratagem, but it often works. Moreover, in a default scenario, no one is there to object in any event, and courts typically do not enforce pleading rules proactively.

RELATED TOPICS AND BLOG POSTS 

Deemed admissions: Trap for the unwary
Disputing the existence of deemed admissions
Motion to strike or withdraw deemed admissions after failure to answer requests for admissions (RFAs)

DEGRASSE NAME SPELLING VARIANTS

This prolific Texas litigator has a compound surname. It is rendered as one word in his address block with the G in Grasse sometimes capitalized within the character string. On his signature, however, the De and the Grasse sometimes appear as separate words, and both are capitalized. Differences in the appearance of the signature on different documents suggests that Attorney DeGrasse (or someone on his behalf) actually signs in person, rather than using a signature stamp or e-signing with an image of his signature. DeGrasse's cover letters do not contain the name of a secretary, paralegal, or other clerical staff.

ADDRESS OF DONALD D. DeGRASSE of DeGRASSE & ROLNICK 

Donald D. DeGrasse
DeGRASSE & ROLNICK
6363 Woodway, Suite 975
Houston, Texas 77057-1713
Tel.: (713) 840-9111
Fax: (713) 840-7263

Web address: www.degrasserolnick.com  



Saturday, September 14, 2013

Christopher D. Osborn (attorney profile)


Christopher D. Osborn Attorney Profile 

Christopher David Osborn a/k/a Chris Osborn used to be associated with ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES and was attorney of record in hundreds if not thousands of cases. His association with ZWICKER ended in Spring 2012, and he was replaced by Attorney Joseph M. O’Bell.  

Osborn went solo and practices as Osborn Law Firm, P.C. in Georgetown, Taylor, and surrounding counties, with a much broader scope in terms of type of legal matters handled than was the case during his tenure with ZWICKER.  
  
Osborn was licensed by the Texas Supreme Court in November 2002. His law degree is from Tulane University, from which he graduated in May 2002 with the Doctor Juris degree necessary for a career as a lawyer. He is also admitted to practice in the four federal District Courts in Texas. According to his State Bar profile (certified  6/5/2013), Osborn does not have a public disciplinary history. Osborn’s State Bar of Texas card number is 24037221.  

Notable opposing party 

In 2009 Christopher D. Osborn was the attorney of record for American Express Centurion Bank in a lawsuit against John Devine in Montgomery County. District Court Judge Fred Edwards granted his motion for final summary judgment, but the attorney's fee component was later reversed by the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont. Devine complained about the cursory nature of Osborn's run-of-the mill fee affidavit and had filed his own counter-affidavit based on expertise on the matter of attorney's fees as a Texas lawyer (but without mentioning that he had been a Harris County district judge). Edwards got de-selected when voters rejected his bid for reelection in the primary, while Devine went on to beat Texas Supreme Court incumbent Medina in the Republican primary and now sits on that court after an easy win in the general election without a Democratic opponent. Edwards has since gone into ADR (special judge, arbitrator, mediator) while Medina joined  Brent Coon & Associates in Houston, right across from the Old Harris County Courthouse. At least he does not have to commute to Austin any more, and, on authority of Chief Jefferson, private law practice is more lucrative in any event, at least after a stint on the state's highest civil court. 

11/24/2014 UPDATE: Judge Edwards is deceased per Texas Bar Journal "memorials" (obit) section.








  

Thursday, September 12, 2013

Joseph M O'Bell - Texas Debt Collection Attorney (2013 profile)


Joseph Marse O’Bell - Individual Attorney Debt Collector Profile 

Joseph O’Bell earned his law degree (JD) at Thomas M. Cooley Law School in 2008, and was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Texas in November 2009. He also admitted to practice in the four federal judicial districts in Texas. Based on his profile with the State Bar of Texas (dated 04/24/2013) O’Bell does not have any public disciplinary or sanctions history.

O’Bell’s SBOT profile reports the firm size for ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES as 25-40. The profile of one of his colleagues (Troy Bolen) quotes the number as 2-5. It is possible the discrepancy reflects inclusion/exclusion of appearance attorneys, i.e. local lawyers who go to court for ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES in various parts of the state for hearings and trials, but do not themselves sign pleadings or motions.  O’Bell’s Texas Bar Card Number is 24070351.

CLERICAL STAFF: Jennifer Falk, Litigation Associate
Casey Balduff, File Clerk
Katherine Shramek, Litigation Assistant  

CLIENTS AND CASES

O’Bell is listed as attorney of record in 228 cases in Harris County District Courts. This compares to almost 600 for his colleague Troy D. Bolen. Bell represents banks almost exclusively. The client list includes the following:

GE CAPITAL RETAIL BANK formerly known as GE Money Bank aka GEMB 
NORDSTROM FSB 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION BANK
AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, FSB
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES   

OBELL's CASES ON APPEAL 

O'Bell was the attorney of record for the bank in LeBeau v. GE Capital Retail Bank, a case in which the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in the creditor's favor that was based on deemed admissions. 

An attorney name search for O'Bell brings up a few more cases, mostly involving Discover Bank card debt. 


Joseph O'Bell appellate case in Texas courts of appeals (click to enlarge the list)